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1. Introduction 
 
If the MDC does not reject the legitimacy of ZANU-PF, we cannot do it 
either. We cannot be more Catholic than the pope.
1
 
Ghulam H. Asmal, Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa
2
 
The moment you adopt policies that impact on other countries, we can no 
longer talk of sovereignty. Then we must remind of the duties and 
responsibilities that we adhere to. 
Samuel Outlule, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Botswana
3
 
How do norms embedded in African international institutions affect state policies? In 
the last two decades, the security dynamics of Southern Africa have seen radical 
changes, both in terms of the conflicts that dominate the region and the way states 
deal with them. These changes have been particularly noticeable in the regional 
response to the political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.
4
 This study 
focuses on two states – Botswana and South Africa – that have chosen unexpected 
and divergent ways of dealing with this regional challenge. The objective is to 
analyze whether, and how, peace and security norms embedded in the regional 
institutions have influenced these two states in their foreign policy towards 
Zimbabwe during the crisis. 
In the post-colonial period before 1990, two ―macro-conflicts‖ were decisive in 
initiating – as well as fuelling – interstate and civil war in the Southern Africa. 
Regionally, the tension between the Apartheid-regime in South Africa and the so-
called frontline states led the former to intervene militarily in Namibia and Angola 
and support anti-government guerrilla groups in Mozambique. Globally, the rivalry 
for influence between the superpowers led to both direct interventions by troops from 
other regions, as well as external funding of parties struggling for power domination.  
                                              
1 MDC - The Movement for Democratic Change, Zimbabwe‘s largest opposition party. 
2 Director of SADC, Africa Multilateral Branch 
3 Permanent Secretary 
4 Investigating the period from 1998 to January 2009. 
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In this period, two regional institutions were instrumental in governing the relations 
between states. The Southern African Development Conference (SADCC) was 
established in 1980 with the objective of reducing member states‘ economic and 
political dependency on South Africa, and coordinate external aid and investments in 
the region (Dokken, 2008:102). In addition, norms on issues of peace and security 
were institutionalized in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The charter of the 
OAU underscored the norms of non-interference, understood as the principles of 
sovereign equality of states, the sanctity of borders, the principle of non-intervention, 
and the rejection of imperialism (Williams, 2007:264-65). Even though there are 
several accounts of violations of these norms, they were considered fundamental both 
by governments and state elites.
5
 In practice, this meant that solidarity between state 
elites trumped solidarity with oppressed populations. Criticism of state leaders on the 
grounds of their domestic policies was considered taboo, and gross human rights 
violations or electoral fraud were not considered issues for regional organizations. 
The end of the Cold War, and the demise of Apartheid in South Africa, marked a new 
era in the regional security dynamics. With superpower rivalry on the decline, states 
in the region could no longer count on external actors to care for their security. 
Hence, they saw the need for creating, and institutionalizing, a sub-regional security 
regime. In 1992 SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). While this formalized the relations between member states and 
made the organization a legal unit under international law, the organization still 
promoted the norms of non-interference (Ngoma, 2005:145).
6
 
At the turn of the millennium, however, a new set of peace and security norms were 
introduced. The amended SADC treaty adopted in 2001, declares that the 
organization and its member states shall act in accordance with the principles of 
                                              
5 The existence of an international norm is not so much conditional on whether it is being violated or not, but rather whether 
norm-breaking leads to sanctions and condemnations by other actors Williams, Paul D. (2007) From Non-Intervention to 
Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture. Afr Aff (Lond) 106:253-79. 
6 E.g. the protocol of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security from 2001, re-affirms the principles of: ―strict 
respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighborliness, 
interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States;‖(SADC Organ, 2001) 
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―human rights, democracy and the rule of law‖. Moreover, their objective is to 
―consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability‖. The 
African Union, superseding the OAU in 2002, condemns unconstitutional changes of 
government and opens for interventions into the internal affairs of member states in 
cases of ―war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity‖ (AU, 2000). This 
introduced the norms of non-indifference to the region, based on the principles of 
non-indifference towards human rights violations, and non-indifference towards 
unconstitutional changes of government within member states (Williams, 2007:255).  
However, the norms of non-indifference did not replace the norms of non-
interference. Rather, both norm sets continued to coexist in Southern Africa. This 
rendered SADC‘s legal framework highly ambiguous with regard to regional 
responses to domestic conflicts and grave human rights abuses.  
1.1 Research question 
SADC‘s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe is a stark example of the inconsistency 
between the organizations‘ institutionalized norms and its practice. The erosion of 
democracy under Mugabe‘s regime first became evident at the turn of the millennium 
with the initiation of a state-led land reform leading to eviction of farm workers. 
Zimbabwe‘s economy was shaken by skyrocketing unemployment combined with an 
equally increasing inflation. This was followed by violent persecution of the political 
opposition and its supporters, human rights violations and fraudulent elections in 
2002, 2005 and 2008. In dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe, SADC and its member 
states have been accused of showing more solidarity with the country‘s president than 
its people – in short, of following the norms of non-interference. However, SADC‘s 
member states have not been unison about how to deal with Zimbabwe, and it seems 
that the individual member states and their governments differ in their commitment to 
the SADC peace and security norms. 
This thesis focuses on two states, namely Botswana and South Africa, which stand 
out for the way their foreign policy relates to SADC‘s ambiguous peace and security 
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norms. Starting with the latter, South Africa, a country praised for its peaceful 
dismantling of the Apartheid regime and initially assumed to be a beacon for human 
rights in the region, has not followed through in its approach to the crisis in 
Zimbabwe. From a rather idealistic stand in 1994, South Africa has gradually 
changed its foreign policy to comply with the norms of non-interference. On the other 
hand, Botswana, despite its modest capabilities both militarily and politically, has 
been the most vocal critic of Mugabe‘s regime in the region, and is the country 
coming closest to comply with the norms of non-indifference (BBC Online, 2008, 
Khama, 2008:24).  
As mentioned at the outset, the objective of this study is to analyze whether, and how, 
norms embedded in SADC have contributed to shape the preferences of Botswana 
and South Africa in their foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. To this end, I adopt 
Jeffrey Checkel‘s (2005) theoretical framework for studying how states are inducted 
into the norms and rules of a community or institution through international 
socialization. Checkel‘s framework has been applied successfully to the European 
context, where scholars examine the mechanism through which ―institutions in 
Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or 
group-community norms‖ (Checkel, 2005:802). Adapting my research objective to fit 
with Checkel‘s theory, my research question is the following: 
What mechanisms
7
 can explain South Africa’s and Botswana’s compliance with 
SADC’s peace and security norms in their approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe? 
This question is answered by analyzing Botswana‘s and South Africa‘s foreign policy 
towards Zimbabwe by means of a structured, focused comparison of the two cases.  
Checkel‘s theoretical framework, does not offer a single theory of socialization. 
Rather, it emphasizes the identification of conditions, or scope conditions, that enable 
or increase the efficiency of the respective causal mechanisms (Checkel, 2005:803). 
                                              
7 There are many ways of understanding the term causal mechanisms, see Mahoney, James. (2003) Tentative Answers to 
Questions About Causal Mechanisms. In American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA. I adopt George and 
Bennett‘s definition that causal mechanisms are ―ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, 
information, or matter to other entities‖. See George, AL, and A Bennett. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. Mit Press. p. 137 
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These conditions can form part of the backdrop of the socialization process in the 
form of special characteristics of the organization or the target state. Or, they can be a 
characteristic of the socialization process itself, such as special features of the 
interaction or the relationship between the actors. Thus, scope conditions provide 
knowledge about the range and applicability of the causal mechanism. For each case, 
I therefore formulate a secondary research question: 
What are the scope conditions under which the socializing mechanism is 
enabled?  
To identify new scope conditions it is important not only to analyze the 
characteristics of the international organization, SADC, but also to analyse the 
historical and institutional context of the two target states, South Africa and 
Botswana.  
The aim of this study is thus twofold. First, determine what mechanisms can explain 
South Africa‘s and Botswana‘s degree of compliance with SADC‘s peace and 
security norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, map 
out the scope conditions which have enabled these socializing mechanisms to operate. 
The analytical framework is thus applied to the African context, in order to test for 
explanatory power and to stimulate further theory development. 
1.2 Why, and how, study international socialization in 
Africa? 
There is a need to demystify African international relations and develop theory that 
can explain outcomes in regional politics. However, because of the neo-patrimonial 
nature of many African states, scholars tend to focus on the exceptional, rather than 
look for general patterns.
8
 This  creates a  picture of African international politics as 
exotic, incomprehensible, and not suitable for theory development (Dokken, 2008). 
                                              
8 Neo-patrimonialism is a term often used to describe the nature of African states. It is a system where patrons, or leaders, 
use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is indicative of informal patron-
client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals. Other related terms are ―degrees 
of statehood‖ (Clapham, 1998) and ―quasi-states‖ (Jackson, 1990). For an overview, see (Dokken, 2008:27-48) 
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However, the fact that African institutions not always function in the way their 
treaties and legal texts indicate does not mean that they are arbitrary or follow no 
observable logic. After all, while the same can easily be said about international 
institutions in Europe, this has not prevented scholars from looking for patterns and 
generalizations in that region.  
Applying classical theories of international relations, such as liberalism and realism, 
to analyse African politics, is far from unproblematic. First, they obscure the 
importance of non-state actors and the idiosyncratic nature of the African state. By 
and large, the state in Africa consists of a variety of state and non-state actors that 
hold diverging interests and interact both in the national as well as the international 
arena (Dokken, 2008:24-25). Second, they are poorly equipped to analyse state-
society interactions of a neo-patrimonial nature and their impact on the development 
of seemingly ―national‖ security policies (Clapham, 1998, Jackson, 1990, Williams, 
2007:255). Third, they do not take into account the impact of ideology and ideas that 
are crucial for understanding how norms influence state behaviour (Hasenclever et 
al., 2000). 
Like rational choice, constructivism is not a substantive theory of International 
Relations, but rather an approach to social inquiry (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001:393). Still, constructivists, by exploring issues of identity and interests, have 
demonstrated that their sociological approach leads to new and meaningful 
interpretations of international politics. According to Alexander Wendt the two 
increasingly accepted basic tenets of constructivism are: 
(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared 
ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of 
purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature 
(Wendt, 1999:1). 
In other words, constructivists argue that it is misleading to consider actor‘s interests 
as ―given‖. Rather, they see actors‘ interests and preferences as socially constructed 
and endogenous to interaction. 
By opening up for influence by non-state and transnational actors, the impact of ideas 
and ideology, and the social construction of identities and preferences, constructivism 
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provides an analytical tool far better suited for studying the impact of African 
international institutions. However, constructivism has its shortcomings. While 
having demonstrated that norms and the social construction of preferences matter, 
they often fail to ―address when, how, and why it occurs‖ (Checkel, 1998:325). This 
shortcoming is also evident in recent constructivist approaches to the study of African 
international politics.
9
 
Conventional constructivism seeks to counter these limitations.
10
 Scholars within this 
approach seek to 
explore the role of social facts—norms or culture—in constructing the interests and 
identities of states and/or agents. True to their ontological underpinnings, such 
―construction‖ comes about not only or primarily through strategic choice but also 
through dynamic processes of persuasion or social learning. In making and 
documenting such claims, these scholars will typically consider alternative 
explanations and/or employ counterfactual analysis (Jupille et al., 2003:14). 
Checkel‘s theory of international socialization is situated within this strain of 
scholars. The framework provides a middle-range theory aimed at integrating 
constructivist theory with empirical research. To this end, it proposes a synthetic 
approach to international socialization that encompasses both rational, instrumental 
choices, and social learning. The objective of the framework is to investigate the 
micro-processes that can explain how actors are ―exposed to, receive, process, and 
then act upon‖ norms within international institutions‖ (Johnston, 2001:488). To this 
end, the theory provides the researcher with a set of causal mechanisms and scope 
conditions that lead to this outcome (Checkel, 2001).  
The way rationalism and constructivism is merged in Checkel‘s theory has three 
benefits. First, it enables an investigation that is sensitive both to policymaker‘s 
material concerns and strategic calculations, as well as ideas and the impact of 
learning and persuasion. This makes the analysis more attentive to the actual 
mechanisms at work, reducing the risk of overemphasising the impact of 
                                              
9 Williams (2007) analyzes the origins and development of the AU‘s security culture and the ongoing process of norm 
localization. However, by bracketing the interaction process where preferences are mediated and subsequently changed, he 
evades the question of how these norms are spread. 
10 Also known as ―modernist‖, ―thin‖ Ruggie, John Gerard. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization. London: Routledge. or ―moderate‖ Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. (2003) 
Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union. Comparative Political Studies 
36:7-40. constructivism. 
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socialization. Second, it provides a richer account of events, because it permits 
explanations that combine several distinct casual mechanisms leading to one 
outcome. Third, while perhaps not appealing to hardcore rationalists, or full-fledged 
―post-positivists‖, the research design may find resonance within the more moderate 
segments of both camps. 
While the concept of international socialization has been fruitful in study of 
interactions processes and outcomes in international institutions in Europe, it has not 
been much applied to study other regions. Johnston and Acharya‘s work on the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an exception in this regard.
11
 
However, when it comes to studies of African international institutions (e.g. Herbst, 
2007), the lack of a rigorous analytical framework prevents these accounts from 
contributing to theory development on African international relations.  
In more practical terms, the pragmatism of theories of international socialization 
make them well suited for studying African international institutions as what they are, 
rather than what scholars believe they ought to be.
12
 Once processes of interaction 
and socialization, or the lack of such, are analysed and mapped out, scholars and 
practitioners are better equipped to address the shortcomings of these institutions and 
propose concrete solutions to mitigate them.  
1.3 The crisis in Zimbabwe and its precedents 
When European settlers arrived in the area now known as Zimbabwe towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, land was distributed disproportionately in favour of the 
Europeans, displacing the Shona, Ndebele, and other indigenous peoples. This laid 
the ground for conflicts over land that has continued up until today. In 1979, the 
Lancaster House Agreement ended the civil war between indigenous groups and the 
                                              
11 See Johnston, Alastair I. (2003) Socialization in International Institutions: The Asean Way and International Relations 
Theory. In In International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by Michael Mastanduno and G. John Ikenberry, 
pp. 487–516 New York: Columbia University Press. and Acharya, Amitav. (2004) How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms 
Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. International Organization 58:239-75. 
12 Other scholarly works that follow this rationale with success is Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. (1999) Africa 
Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. 
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white minority-led government of Ian Smith. However, despite the landslide victory 
of Robert Mugabe and ZANU in the following elections, the handling of the land 
issue was deferred to a later stage.
13
  
Freedom from colonizers did not mean freedom from violence. Conflicts among the 
indigenous political groupings did not end until ZANU and ZAPU reached a unity 
agreement in 1988 that merged the two parties, creating ZANU-PF. However, the 
reconciled liberation movements were not able to solve the problem of skewered land 
distribution. In 1998 Mugabe‘s decisions to participate in the war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and admit pensions to veterans from the war for 
independence, contributed to severely strain the country‘s budget. At the same time 
Zimbabwe‘s trade union launched its own political party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC), posing a threat to Mugabe‘s power base. In an attempt to 
strengthen the support for ZANU-PF in rural areas, Mugabe began to redistribute 
land to blacks in 2000, claiming that whites made up less than 1% of the population, 
but held 70% of the country‘s commercially viable arable land (BBC Online, 2002). 
The chaotic implementation of the land reform led to a sharp decline in agricultural 
exports, the country‘s leading export producing sector. As a result, Zimbabwe 
experienced a severe hard-currency shortage, which has led to hyperinflation and 
chronic shortages in imported fuel and consumer goods. In 2002, Zimbabwe was 
suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations on charges of human rights abuses 
during the process of land redistribution, as well as the rigging of elections (BBC 
Online, 2003).  
The Zimbabwean parliamentary elections held in March 2005, in which ZANU-PF 
won a two-thirds majority, were again criticized by international observers as being 
flawed. The opposition party, MDC, reported of threats and intimidations prior to the 
elections, as well as tampering with the vote during the elections. For these reasons, 
the senate elections the same year were largely boycotted by the MDC (Matlosa, 
2005). The same year, the African Commission‘s Fact Finding Mission Report on 
                                              
13 ZANU - The Zimbabwe African National Union 
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Zimbabwe documented serious human rights violations (Tsunga, 2005).
14
 SADC 
however, endorsed the elections as free and fair. 
On March 11, 2007, several opposition officials, among them MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai, were brutally assaulted while in police custody. This was followed by a 
wave of petrol bombings of selected police stations countrywide. In reaction to these 
events, the SADC heads of state convened in an extraordinary meeting in Dar-Es-
Salaam to find an urgent solution. The summit called for a SADC sponsored inter-
party dialogue that was to be facilitated by South Africa‘s president Thabo Mbeki 
(Badza, 2008). 
In this period, a drought affecting the entire region, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
hyperinflation, and the government‘s price controls and land reforms all contributed 
to deepen Zimbabwe‘s economic and humanitarian crisis. This created a tense and 
conflict-ridden environment for the harmonized elections held in March 2008.
15
  
The major contestants for the presidential seat were Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-PF 
and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T. It was generally acknowledged that the latter 
had achieved a significant majority of seats in the election, but results were withheld 
for several weeks. Violent persecution and arrests of opposition politicians and 
supporters were commonplace both before and after the first election round. As a 
result, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second run-off. Mugabe retained control by 
gaining 85 percent of the vote in the second round, where he was the only presidential 
candidate.  
In September 2008, the MDC and ZANU-PF reached a power-sharing agreement 
where Mugabe would remain as president and Tsvangirai would become prime 
minister. However, due to ministerial differences between the political parties and 
foot-dragging by Mugabe, the agreement was not fully implemented until February 
13, 2009. In the meantime, problems in Zimbabwe reached crisis proportions in the 
                                              
14 Assembly/AU/Dec.56 (IV) 
15 The harmonized elections comprised presidential, house of assembly, senatorial and local government elections, all held 
on one day. 
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areas of living standards and public health. A major cholera outbreak is said to have 
claimed more than 3300 lives (BBC Online, 2009).  
1.4 The thesis in outline 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents Checkel‘s theoretical framework 
on international socialization more thoroughly. Moreover, it discusses the challenges 
that arise when transporting this theory to the study of international organizations in 
Southern Africa. On the basis of this discussion it develops new scope conditions that 
are relevant to the SADC region and makes judgements about which causal 
mechanisms are more likely to prevail under these conditions.  
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and design of the research. This study uses a 
combination of the method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 
2005) and process-tracing, in order to identify and validate the causal mechanisms 
leading to the socialization of norms within the SADC. In this thesis, the method of 
structured, focused comparison is operationalized in a three-step procedure. The first 
step is to briefly present the state‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during the 
crisis, and determine to which degree it conforms to SADC‘s peace and security 
norms. The second step is to analyse the historical and institutional context of the 
state in question. The third step is to analyse whether the foreign policy outcome in 
each case is the result of regional socialization by scoring the indicators of each 
socializing mechanism, namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and 
normative suasion. Furthermore, it is to identify the scope conditions enabling this 
mechanism to operate.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the two cases of South Africa‘s and Botswana‘s foreign 
policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe in relation to international socialization. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study, first, by summarizing and comparing the findings of 
the two case studies. Second, it evaluates the utility of the theoretical framework for 
studying international relations in Africa. Finally, policy implications following from 
this study are presented. 
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1.5 Findings 
The findings of the present study indicate that Checkel‘s theoretical framework 
proves itself fruitful both in identifying regional norm socialization, as well as in 
disproving the impact of the phenomenon. It argues that South Africa was socialized 
into the norms of non-interference as a result of mainly social influence by SADC‘s 
in-group of former liberation movement states. Further, it argues that Botswana‘s 
approach to Zimbabwe was mainly the result of cost-benefit calculation independent 
of regional socialization. However, the analysis also showed that socialization 
facilitated Botswana‘s choice of taking a tougher stance towards the regime in 
Harare.  
Moreover, the study provides further indications of the utility of engaging a 
theoretical approach that cuts across the rationalist/constructivist divide. It argues that 
strategic calculations to a large extent can explain the behaviour of the actors. At the 
same time however, issues of identity and identification play a pivotal role in 
determining the preferences and interests upon which these strategic calculations are 
based.  
There are two important limits to the study. First, it only analyzes state and non-state 
interactions within the SADC community. This means that while socialization 
attempts from extra-regional actors are commented upon, they are in no way given 
the same scrutiny as processes of regional socialization. Second, it analyzes 
socialization at the level of the state. This might seem paradoxical, considering the 
nature of African states. However, it does not mean that transnational processes are 
not addressed. Rather, they form part of discussions of identity and identification in 
the region. Moreover, although parts of the data describe socialization at the agent 
level, inferences are only made at the state level. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents the analytical framework that will be applied to analyse 
regional socialization within SADC. First, it presents the constructivist approach to 
regional norms and identity. These concepts are a key to understand and appreciate 
the theoretical framework. The second part of the chapter presents and 
operationalizes the four causal mechanisms that connect socialization with norm 
compliance. It also presents the various scope conditions describing when, and under 
what conditions, a particular socialization outcome is more likely. The third section 
transports the theoretical framework to the Southern African context. Moreover, it 
articulates and presents SADC scope conditions that are likely to be salient for 
processes of regional socialization in Southern Africa. 
2.1 International norms  and state identity 
Among constructivist scholars there is general agreement on the definition of a norm 
as a ―standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity‖ (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2005:891, Katzenstein, 1996:5). In order to understand the concept of 
norms, it is therefore necessary to explore the concept of identity. Although an exact 
definition of identity has yet to be agreed upon (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:399), 
Alexander Wendt (1999) has moved modern constructivism along in addressing this 
problem. Wendt argues that while state identities are rooted in an actor‘s self-
understandings, they also depend on whether that identity is recognized by other 
actors. This gives them an intersubjective quality. Thus, identities are constituted by 
the interaction of these internal and external ideas. Wendt identifies several types of 
identities, of which two will be relevant for this study: role identities and type 
identities. The former is a product of dyadic relationships between states, and is in its 
nature uniquely social. Role identities include enemies, allies, partners etc. Type 
identities, on the other hand, are social categories that share some social 
characteristics. This content is given by more or less formal membership rules that 
define what counts as a type identity. State type identities include regime types or 
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forms of states, such as: democratic, authoritarian, monarchic, developmental, neo-
patrimonial etc. They also include other ―inescapable‖ characteristics, such as 
African, Southern African etc.
16
 Unlike role identities, however, the characteristics 
that underlie type identities are intrinsic to actors. At any time in history, certain type 
identities have more or less international legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001:399). In the contemporary state system, a liberal democratic type identity is 
afforded the most legitimacy (Clark, 2005). 
As standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity, norms can be 
codified in international law or be customary, i.e. habitual. Norms are not set in stone; 
they can emerge, evolve, spread into new arenas or regions, or disappear. When 
norms spread or new norms emerge, they are not introduced into a normative 
vacuum. Rather, they enter a highly contested normative space where they must 
compete with other norms and perceptions of interest. In these situations, compliance 
with well-established norms might be considered appropriate, while compliance with 
emerging norms is often considered explicitly ―inappropriate‖. Since norms, by 
definition, embody a quality of obligation or virtue and shared moral assessment, they 
―prompt justifications for actions and leave an extensive trail of communication 
among actors‖ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2005:897). The emergence of new norms can 
therefore bring about frictions and conflict between actors. 
Belief in the impact of norms on state conduct has often been juxtaposed to 
rationalism and rational thought. According to rationalists, subjects are guided by a 
logic of consequences, always seeking to maximize their own gains within the given 
structure. Hence, if a state happens to comply with an international norm it does so 
because this is deemed the most likely way to obtain what is in that states‘ interests. 
Rational choice theory also holds that these interests or preferences are given 
exogenously. This means that while the means to fulfil goals might depend on the 
environment, interests are given prior to interaction and remain static. Constructivist 
theory however, argues that structure does not only constrain the actors, it also 
                                              
16 However, these categories undoubtedly also have a social component. Think only about the position of Turkey and Israel 
in relation to a European or Asian type identity. 
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constitutes their identity. State preferences are therefore not exogenous or given prior 
to interaction, but are created and shaped intersubjectively. According to 
constructivists, agents are guided by a logic of appropriateness. Instead of acting 
―rationally‖ – doing what will possibly maximize gains – states try to do what is 
considered appropriate for an actor with their identity. As an example, human rights 
norms may constrain state behaviour less because of power considerations, than 
because they are a constitutive feature of democratic states.  
However, this strict division between rationalism and norms is rejected by many 
constructivist scholars (Checkel, 1997, Checkel, 1999).
17
 They argue that the utilities 
of actors can be specified as social or ideational, as well as material. According to 
Finnemore and Sikkink (2005:910-11), such strict divisions between norms and 
rationalism ignore the fact that instrumental rationality and strategic interaction play a 
significant role in highly politicized social construction of norms, preferences, 
identities and common knowledge by actors in world politics. 
2.2 Four mechanisms of international socialization  
The aim of this study is twofold. First, determine what mechanisms can explain South 
Africa‘s and Botswana‘s degree of compliance with SADC‘s peace and security 
norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, map out the 
scope conditions, under which these socializing mechanisms are enabled.  
To this end, it applies Checkel‘s theoretical framework for studying international 
socialization. The concept of international socialization refers to the process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. This implies that an 
actor switches either from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness, or from following one logic of appropriateness to following another 
logic of appropriateness. In this study, international socialization is conceptualized as 
the process of inducting South Africa and Botswana into compliance with the peace 
                                              
17 See also Wendt, Alexander, and James Fearon. (2002) Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Handbook of 
International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnæs, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, pp. XX, 571 s. London: Sage. 
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and security norms of SADC. This is understood as degrees of compliance with either 
the norms of non-indifference or the norms of non-interference. This distinction will 
be further operationalized in the following chapter (see p. 40). 
In this study, the term causal mechanism refers to the ―intermediate processes along 
which international institutions may lead actors toward accepting the norms, rules, 
and modes of behaviour of a given community‖ (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049). The 
causal mechanisms are thus descriptions of how processes of international 
socialization might occur. Checkel theorizes four such ―intermediate processes‖ or 
causal mechanisms, namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative 
suasion. The objective of the theoretical framework is thus to determine whether 
these mechanisms are responsible for norm compliant foreign policy outcome, and 
moreover, under which conditions these causal mechanisms operate in Southern 
Africa.  
2.2.1 Strategic calculation: bargaining and social influence 
The mechanisms of bargaining and social influence can be grouped together under 
the larger and more general mechanism of strategic calculation. When these 
mechanisms are operating, agents act instrumentally rational, and comply with group 
norms because they seek to maximize their interests. These benefits are often induced 
when international institutions offer the government of a target state positive 
incentives and rewards, on the condition that it adopts and complies with the 
community norms. While these interests can be both material and/or ideational, they 
are always seen as exogenous to interaction. Moreover, since agents always act 
rationally, they can – and will – break with these norms if it benefits their given 
interests. Therefore, when these mechanisms operate alone there can – by definition – 
be no socialization or internalization of norms. In other words, no change from a 
logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness occurs (Checkel, 2005:805-09).  
Bargaining implies that the community or institution can be conceived as an actor 
that uses carrots or sticks through the manipulation of constraints. When this is the 
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operating mechanism, behavioural adaptation in line with community norms is more 
likely under the following scope conditions: 
 Intergovernmental reinforcement: Targeted governments expect the promised 
rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance.  
 Transnational reinforcement: Targeted social actors expect the costs of putting 
pressure on the government to be lower than the benefits of conditional 
external rewards, and these actors are strong enough to force the government 
to comply with the international norms. (Checkel, 2005:809, Schimmelfennig, 
2005).  
Social influence implies that the community or institution is perceived as a social 
environment, or structure, that induces change in agent behaviour through the 
distribution of social rewards and punishments (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1052-53). In 
this case, the mere membership of the international institution evokes the 
socialization of actors. Deviant behaviour is corrected by the international equivalent 
of ―group pressure‖ (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049). Rewards might include 
psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being 
derived from conformity with role expectations. Punishments might include shaming, 
shunning and exclusion. The effect of successful social influence is an actor‘s 
conformity with the position advocated by a group as a result of ―real or imagined 
group pressure‖ (Nemeth in Johnston, 2001:499). Thus, while persuasion would 
entail public conformity with private acceptances, social influence can come in the 
form of ―mediated normative influence‖. This means that behaviour is chosen 
because ―it is considered appropriate for maximizing social rewards‖ (Johnston, 
2005:1034). Building on this argument, I add that social influence can be operative 
even before any rewards and punishments have been given. This may happen, when 
states ―know‖ that deviant behaviour will be punished, and consequently seek to 
decrease friction in their relations with other states or institutions. Friction is here not 
necessarily understood as a conflict, but as controversy that requires agents to justify 
their actions and risk isolation. While some states have interests that make them 
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willing to risk such frictions or conflicts, others follow the path that the group 
community already has set out.  
One way of clarifying the difference between bargaining and social influence is to 
combine the dichotomy of preferences (the focus of arguing) versus constraints (the 
focus of bargaining), with the dichotomy of socialization through actors versus 
socialization through structures (see table 1).  
TABLE 1. A typology of socialization mechanisms  
 What gets changed? 
What induces change? Constraints Preferences 
Actor Bargaining Normative suasion 
Structure Social influence Role-playing 
(Zürn and Checkel, 2005) 
Accordingly, ―international institutions can be conceived as actors who use 
persuasive tactics or carrots and sticks, or conceived as providing a social 
environment that channels social influence and induces certain role enactments‖ 
(Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1052). However, it is central to note that the distinction 
between bargaining and social influence is related to the role of the community, as an 
actor or a structure, and not to the use of material or ideational constraints. After all, a 
central tenet of constructivist approach is that meaning is socially constructed. 
Accordingly, what hardcore rationalists would categorize as a strictly material 
constraint, such as a sanction, also has a socially constructed meaning, in the form of 
shaming or social exclusion.  
The rewards and punishments of social influence are considered social because only 
groups can provide them, and only groups whose approval an actor values will have 
this influence (Johnston, 2001:499). Thus a scope condition increasing the likelihood 
of social influence is when: 
  The target state has prior identification with the socializing group.  
Based on Schimmelfennig‘s (2005:830-32) operationalization of strategic calculation 
I identify three indicators of strategic calculation: two that that apply for both 
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bargaining and social influence and one that distinguishes between the two 
mechanisms.  (1) When informants frame foreign policy decisions as a weighing of 
costs and benefits. Target states conform to international norms if it increases their 
utility, and on the condition that the cost of adaptation is smaller than the benefits of 
external rewards or the costs of external punishment. Such reward and punishments 
include aid and economic assistance, as well as membership in – or threats of 
exclusion from – international institutions. (2) When actors manipulate the norms 
strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. They use and interpret 
international norms to justify their self-interested claims, and frame their preferences 
and actions as norm consistent. (3) The last indicator distinguishes between 
bargaining and social influence. Bargaining entails that the institution operates as one 
actor, while social influence, requires that the international institution constitutes a 
social environment (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049).  
2.2.2 Role-playing 
The concept of role-playing has roots in organizational theory and cognitive/social 
psychology. This approach sees agents as boundedly rational, implying that they 
―experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing 
(receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information‖ (Simon in Williamson, 
1981:553). On the state level this implies that actors with limited resources do not 
have the capability to thoroughly calculate the costs and benefits of all possible 
courses of action. In this context, organizational or group environments provide 
simplifying shortcuts, cues and buffers that can lead to the enactment of particular 
role conceptions, or role playing. Hence, instead of trying to attend to all situations 
and issues simultaneously, boundedly rational states resort to role playing. They act 
according to what is expected of them, but without reflecting consciously on the 
reasons for choosing exactly that course of action. When role-playing, policymakers 
acquire the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations – 
irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. When this mechanism is 
dominant, conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role-
playing. The shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness has 
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started (Checkel, 2005:804). According to Johnston, role-playing actors have no 
preference over means, and only vaguely formed preferences over ends (Johnston, 
2005). Building on this, I add that role-playing implies a thin preference change, in 
the way that the actor‘s preferences shift towards gaining acceptance by the group 
community.  
Checkel present several scope conditions for role-playing at the agent level. 
However, as I focus on socialization at the state level, these scope conditions are not 
relevant for this study. Instead, I propose a scope condition that is in accordance with 
the previous conceptualization of role-playing. Thus, this socializing mechanism is 
more likely to operate when: 
 The bureaucratic capacity of the target state is low, impeding policymakers 
from resorting to cost-benefit calculations typical of bargaining and social 
influence.
18
 
Johnston states that choosing which groups to role-play involves a degree of prior 
identification. Hence, like for the mechanism of social influence, a second scope 
condition increasing the likelihood of adopting new role conceptions in line with 
community/group norms is therefore when:  
 The target state has prior identification with the socializing group.  
This study uses two indicators of role-playing. (1) When agents/actors comply with 
group/community norms, but in an unreflected manner. Rather than consider whether 
the course of action is right or wrong, informants emphasize that it is what is done 
and what is expected within this particular institutional setting (Checkel, 2005:811). 
(2) When states comply differently with norms across contexts.
19
 This indicates that 
norms are not internalized. Thus, if the state belongs to, or operates within, several 
institutions or communities, it might behave according to one set of norms in one 
community, while following another set of norms in another setting.  
                                              
18 Bureaucratic capacity can be low due to several factors, such as public servants‘ and politicians‘ inexperience or lack of 
training, material constraints, corruption, etc. 
19 By context, I here mean different levels of societal interaction, ranging from the domestic, to the regional and further to 
the extra-regional or global level. 
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2.2.3 Normative suasion 
Constructivist scholars add a communicative understanding of rationality drawing on 
Habermasian social theory, as well as insights from social psychology. When this 
mechanism is operating, communicatively rational social agents do not so much 
calculate costs and benefits or seek cues from their environment. Instead, these agents 
present arguments and try to persuade and convince each other. In other words, their 
interests and preferences are open for redefinition depending on the arguments that 
are raised (Risse-Kappen, 2003:6-11). When this form of arguing takes place, agents 
actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness. 
Arguments and attempts at persuasion may then change the most basic properties of 
agents, namely their identities and their interests (Checkel, 2005:812). 
Contributors to the literature on international socialization articulate a series of scope 
conditions under which persuasion-socialization dynamics occur. They suggest that 
arguing and persuasion are more likely to change the interests of social agents and 
lead to arguing when the following conditions hold (Gheciu, 2005, Lewis, 2005): 
 The target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment 
and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information. 
 The target of socialization has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent 
with the socializing agency‘s message. 
 The socializing agency does not lecture or demand, but instead acts out 
principles of serious deliberative argument.  
 The socializing agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the 
target belongs or wants to belong 
This study uses three indicators of normative suasion that leads to norm compliance. 
(1) When informants provide full and thorough justifications for their compliance 
with the peace and security norms, indicating that they not only see their actions as 
beneficial, or expected of them, but actually the right thing to do, even though they 
might not always have thought so (Checkel, 2005:812). This indicates internalization 
of the peace and security norms. (2) When informants argue that similar issues should 
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be dealt with in the same way. This indicates consistency with norms across contexts, 
and strengthens the evidence of internalization. (3) When informants explain changes 
or developments leading to policies consistent with SADC peace and security norms 
by referring to interactions characterized as ―persuasion, arguing or learning‖. 
However, in real life, people are not necessarily aware of how or where they learnt 
something new. Therefore, for this indicator to be confirmed, it does not have to be 
entirely clear to the socialized agent him/herself how the change has come about. 
However, the informant should explain that these interactions of arguing and 
persuasion made them see events ―in a new light‖ or provided ―new perspective to the 
understanding of the issue‖. Without this indicator, there is not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that normative suasion has found place.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation of how scope conditions are linked to 
compliance through causal mechanisms. 
 
Role-playing 
Social influence 
Bargaining 
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FIGURE 1. Linking scope conditions to compliance through causal mechanisms 
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2.3 Transporting the framework to the African context 
Checkel‘s theoretical framework is originally developed to analyse European 
relations and institutions. To be fruitful for the study of Southern African 
international politics, certain adaptations ought to be made. The following section 
discusses important differences between African and European international 
institutions and presents the implications of these considerations for the theoretical 
framework. 
2.3.1 Fewer contact points  
In contrast with their European counterparts, African international organizations have 
much fewer contact points between state agents, and thus fewer venues where 
socialization can take place. Even regional organizations like SADC are characterised 
by having sparsely funded secretariats with few permanent staff members and state 
representatives. In contrast, most of the scholarly works that focus on norm 
socialization study processes of intense interaction between states and state officials 
within tight-knit European institutions (Checkel, 2005, Gheciu, 2005, 
Schimmelfennig, 2005). However, this does not necessarily imply that there are no 
arenas for socialization in Southern Africa. The SADC summit and the SADC Organ 
for Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) both have meetings at regular intervals.  
Additionally, state agents meeting within SADC generally have more power in their 
hands. Thus, successful socialization attempts within the organization are likely to 
have greater impact on the target states‘ policies. SADC meetings usually consist of 
state leaders, presidents or foreign ministers, who interact and make decisions. 
Simultaneously, many African states are characterised by a weak civil society and a 
highly centralized decision making process. In such societies, socialization of the top 
leadership can be inferred to have a great impact on foreign policy (Risse-Kappen, 
1995).
20
 As a result of this feature, a scope condition increasing the likelihood of 
                                              
20 After all, foreign policy making can be centralized even if the domestic sphere in general is highly decentralized (c.f. the 
features of the neo-patrimonial state). 
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socialization within SADC is when there is a high degree of power centralization in 
the target state government. 
2.3.2 Group dynamics and divergent values 
African international institutions are inclusive and democratic, in the sense that they 
usually have no criteria for membership and all decisions are made by consensus. 
This is in sharp contrast with the EU, where future members have to fulfil a set of 
criteria before at all entering into negotiations with the organization. In Europe, 
norms are usually spread from the core to the periphery, from the community of 
states that are already members towards future members. This creates an in-group of 
member states with a shared set of norms, and an out-group of members-to-be that 
have to comply with these norms to become part of the EU. Within African 
institutions, norms are contested not primarily between members and members-to-be, 
but between groups within the organization itself. 
Within SADC, there are no decided-upon common values to which all member states 
adhere and that can be spread to the organization‘s members (Nathan, 2006). This 
makes cooperation and achievements both on economic as well as security issues 
difficult (Dokken, 2008:102-03). Nathan points to two key lines of divisions within 
SADC: between pacific and militarist approaches to regional security, and between 
democratic and authoritarian orientations in domestic politics (Nathan, 2006:606). On 
these issues, the most accentuated dividing line has been drawn between those states 
that are led by armed liberation movements and those escaping from colonial rule 
through negotiations. In the former camp, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola are the 
main actors, while Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania form part of the latter. South 
Africa holds a special position, as it is a mixture of the two, having experienced both 
armed and political struggle, leading to a political compromise with the end of 
Apartheid in 1994. While some states fluctuate in their allegiance, and can be found 
on both sides of the dividing line on certain issues,
21
 the overall pattern shows the 
                                              
21 Mozambique actually seems to position itself mainly in the out-group, despite its history as a former liberation movement 
state. 
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armed liberation – negotiated settlement dichotomy to hold. Within SADC, the 
national tensions are transferred to the organization, making it hard to agree on 
common objectives.  
According to Johnston (2005:1020), international socialization is contingent on the 
international organization having a coherent identity with a clearly linked set of 
normative characteristics. Without this feature, it is alleged, socialization effects will 
be diluted, or nonexistent. While SADC‘s lack of such coherence may complicate 
international socialization, the phenomenon is not precluded. However, it does mean 
that an analysis of regional socialization in Southern Africa must be attentive to three 
idiosyncrasies of SADC. First, the lack of common values and identity makes it 
unlikely that the organization operates as one unitary actor. Instead, SADC has the 
feature of an arena or social environment, where norms are contested and group 
dynamics influence socialization processes.  This make bargaining less likely, and 
increases the impact of social influence (Johnston, 2001:499). Second, it creates 
group dynamics within the organization that are likely to affect policy outcomes, 
where identification with either the in-group or the out-group (or other groups), is 
likely to determine what norms are adopted. Third, the lack of shared norms also 
creates a lack of trust between states and groups of states, in turn requiring attention 
to state identities and especially role identities (see p.17). While role identities shared 
by European states are mainly restricted to ally and partner, role identities found in 
the Southern Africa include ally, enemy, hegemon and partner. I argue that the 
identity of the target state is likely to affect the way actors relate to these states, 
influencing processes of socialization. This relates to Johnston‘s scope condition 
stating that identification with the socializing group increases the likelihood of both 
social influence and role-playing. 
2.3.3 Hollow promises  
According to Herbst (2007), African institutions tend to be hollow, meaning that 
member states may have few intentions of upholding the laws and rules of these 
organizations. This however, does not mean that African international organizations 
do not serve a concrete purpose. Historically, domestic forces have threatened 
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African leaders much more concretely than international concerns. The result is that 
African state leaders, in general, are much more attentive to the rational design of 
international institutions to protect and extend their domestic standing rather than 
strengthen their states‘ standing on international issues. As a consequence, they are 
extremely enthusiastic about regional cooperation that highlights sovereignty, helps 
secure national leaders hold on power, and asks little in return (Herbst, 2007:130). By 
insisting on inclusive institutions with a high degree of democracy, African leaders 
have ensured that the probability of the institution taking action against any particular 
country is minimal (Herbst, 2007:136-37).  
While this might be the modus operandi of many African state elites, also within 
SADC (Matlosa, 2005:6), Botswana and South Africa do not necessarily adopt this 
approach to regional cooperation. They are both democracies where the ruling parties 
enjoy a high degree of public support. Both governments have received more than 50 
percent of the votes in every election since majority rule was introduced (Botswana: 
1966, South Africa: 1994). Since 1995, both countries have been labelled free in 
Freedom Houses annual assessments of civil and political liberties. These two 
countries should therefore be more likely to fulfil their international obligations, than 
to use international institutions merely to bolster their own legitimacy.  
However, while many of these institutions may have been created for questionable 
purposes, and their treaties contain obligations that are never intended to be 
implemented, state leaders have no guarantee that this will always be the case. In his 
analysis of European integration, Leon Lindberg (1970) introduces the concept of 
―forward linkage‖. This describes a phenomenon where an obligation to participate in 
common decision-making spurs a process that considerably increases the scope of the 
system or its institutional capacities. The ambiguity of SADCs rules on peace and 
security issues has made it possible for member states to sign protocols and treaties 
without intentions of honouring them. As long as there is no agreement on how to 
interpret these legal texts, they represent no threat to state leaders that fear 
progressive norms. However, if member states start using certain parts of the legal 
framework for self-interested purposes, it becomes increasingly harder to ignore the 
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other, less desirable, aspects of the legal framework. In other words, treaties that 
initially were considered hollow may at some later time come to be seen as binding. 
Related to this issue, is the use of legal texts as templates for right conduct. In her 
study of socialization within NATO, Gheciu (2005) argues that much of the 
―teaching‖ or persuading appears to involve agents from the defense organization 
offering legal, organizational and normative templates for reorganizing civil-military 
relations in new member states. While Gheciu interprets this as an instance of 
normative suasion, Johnston (2005:1023) suggests that the templates themselves 
could be responsible for eliciting new norms of behavior. To clarify: if normative 
suasion implies a teacher saying ―this is the way you should do X, if you have 
identity Y‖, he argues that the templates also can be seen to provide a ―method for 
acting Y-like‖. Hence, by this rationale, the mere existence of such templates could 
facilitate role-playing.  
Johnston then goes on to question why these templates constrain actor behavior. Are 
these constrains merely institutional, prescribing the construction of new 
organizations with the related incentives to optimize material, social or psychological 
interests? Or are they ideational, the templates themselves embodying concepts of 
identity and interest? In the former case, templates might facilitate socialization 
through bargaining or social influence. In the latter, however, the templates do not 
necessarily only provide constrains or simplifying shortcuts regarding expected 
behavior. Rather, I argue that the templates can, in their own right, convey arguments 
that change the basic properties of agents, namely their identities and their interests. 
In Europe, such templates are normally accompanied by some authoritative actor or 
―teacher‖ eliciting community norms. In SADC however, because of the feature of 
hollow promises, the templates sometimes never become more than ideas in the 
treaties and protocols. I argue, however, that such templates still may have the ability 
change agents‘ identities and interests. This is not very likely to happen when 
templates and state identities are on collision course. However, if the identity and 
interests of the target state is already ―in tune‖ with the identity and interests inherent 
in the template, I argue that states can learn new conceptions of identity and interests 
from these templates, without the existence of a ―teacher‖ or ―authoritative actor‖. In 
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this way, target states can actively internalize new understandings of appropriateness 
– in other words be socialized – solely by the power of the argument inherent in the 
template. 
This leads to the identification of two scope conditions. First, the existence of legal 
templates with explicit guidelines for appropriate conduct make it easier for target 
states to identify and adopt appropriate behavior, thus increasing the likelihood of 
international socialization. Second, how states relate to, and interpret these legal texts 
is likely to be influenced by the identity of the member state. A state is more prone to 
follow templates that embody concepts of identity and interests that are compatible 
with its existing or desired identity. Thus, this confirms the importance of state 
identity as a scope condition of socialization  
2.3.4 SADC scope conditions 
As the previous discussion has demonstrated, African international institutions in 
general and SADC in particular differ from their European counterparts in several 
aspects. The aforementioned characteristics of fewer contact points, group dynamics, 
divergent values and hollow promises, are likely to affect processes of norm 
socialization in the region. Based on the original scope conditions identified in 
Checkel‘s research project (2007), and the previous discussion, I therefore articulated 
a new set of scope conditions that are specific to the SADC context (see table 2).  
In the analysis of the case studies, these scope conditions will be scrutinized in order 
to determine whether they have a significant impact, enabling or increasing the 
likelihood of any of the four socialization mechanisms to take place.  
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Table 2. SADC Scope Conditions
22
 
Properties of the 
socializing actor 
Group dynamics of the organization  
Socializing actor does not lecture or demand 
Socializing actor is authoritative member of in-group 
to which the target wants to belong 
The existence of legal templates with explicit 
guidelines for appropriate conduct 
Intergovernmental reinforcement  
Transnational reinforcement 
Properties of the target 
state  
Prior beliefs 
Identification with socializing group  
Identity of target state 
Degree of power centralization in the government  
Bureaucratic capacity 
Novel environment 
                                              
22 The label ―SADC scope conditions‖ implies that they are inherent, but not exclusive to, the SADC context. The scope 
conditions originate both from Checkel‘s framework (2.2.1-2.2.3) and from the recent discussion (2.3.1-2.3.3). 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology undertaken in this study. First, it 
presents how the qualitative case study, and the method of structured, focused 
comparison, is applied to study norm socialization within SADC. Second, it shows 
how the reliability and validity of the data is strengthened by the use of the process-
tracing and data-triangulation. Third, it presents Adcock and Colliers (2001) model 
for increasing measurement validity in reference to the variables. 
3.1 The qualitative case study 
In accordance with Checkel‘s recommendations, this investigation of regional 
socialization is performed as a case study.
23
 More specifically, it follows George and 
Bennett‘s (2005) method of structured, focused comparison, using process-tracing as 
the main technique to guide the gathering and structuring of the empirical data.  
George and Bennett (2005:17) define a case as ―an instance of a class of events‖. In 
this study, the class of events is socialization within international institutions. I study 
two ―instances‖, namely the socialization of South Africa and Botswana, 
respectively, into different degrees of compliance with the peace and security norms 
of SADC, in their foreign policy approach towards Zimbabwe. George and Bennett 
(2005:5) define the case study approach as a ―detailed examination of an aspect of an 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable 
to other events‖. Mabry (2008:214-15) states that the ―raison d’être of case study is 
deep understanding of particular instances of a phenomenon‖. This implies that the 
investigation needs to go beyond countable aspects and trends. It demands an interest, 
not only in the overall patterns, but in the peculiarities of each case. The attention to 
detail that the case study offers, allows for contextualized comparisons of 
                                              
23 According to Checkel (2007:817), the case study technique is a preferred approach to studying international socialization 
because it is ―especially well suited to establishing scope conditions and examining causal mechanisms‖. Several of the 
contributors to Checkel‘s volume use process-tracing as their main method. 
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phenomena, which larger scale statistical studies do not (George and Bennett, 
2005:19). 
In this study, the cases have been selected for two main reasons. First, as mentioned 
in the introduction chapter, they represent diverging and unexpected approaches to 
the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, because these states often are seen as the democratic 
forerunners of the sub-region, it is of particular interest to study how they relate to 
and are influenced by SADC‘s peace and security norms. 
3.1.1 Structured, focused comparison 
The methodological framework of this study is based on, but not equal to, the method 
of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005). This is a method that 
makes it possible to draw generalizations from a small number of cases. It requires 
the researcher to structure the analysis of each case around a set of ‗standardized 
general questions‘ and focus selectively on those aspects of each case that are 
relevant for the research question. The main objective of this task is not the question 
formulation in itself, but to insist that case researchers follow a procedure of 
systematic data compilation. Hence, while not asking the question explicitly, I present 
the following three-step procedure to ensure that data is compiled and analysed 
systematically – and equally – in both cases: 
First, I start by briefly presenting the state‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during 
the crisis, and determine to which degree it conforms to SADC‘s peace and security 
norms. Second, I analyse the historical and institutional context of the state in 
question. Historical context refers to features of the state that are consequences of 
historical developments, including prior beliefs, identity and identification. 
Institutional context refers to the configuration of the state, comprising bureaucratic 
capacity, degree of power centralization, and the novelty of the situation. The 
objective of this task is to set the stage for each case and determine the configuration 
of the scope conditions that are properties of the target state (See table 3, p. 33). 
Third, I analyse whether the foreign policy outcome in each case is the result of 
regional socialization by scoring the indicators of each socializing mechanism, 
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namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative suasion. Furthermore 
I identify the scope conditions enabling this mechanism to operate. To avoid drawing 
hasty conclusions in regard to the impact of socialization, I also present rival 
explanations and discuss whether they are able to account for the actor‘s norm 
compliant behaviour.  
External validity concerns the issue of determining whether findings can be 
generalized beyond the specific case study. The aim of this study is to apply 
Checkel‘s model to the African context in order to test for explanatory power and to 
stimulate further theory development. Considering that the scope conditions 
identified are specific to the SADC context, the findings should be applicable mainly 
to other cases of regional norm socialization in Southern Africa. Additionally, the 
model can serve as basis for the development of frameworks for studying 
international socialization outside Europe. 
3.2 Data 
Reliability relates to whether the researcher demonstrates that the operations of a 
study can be repeated with the same results. The objective is to minimize errors and 
biases in the study (Yin, 2003:37). This requires transparency with regard to choice 
of methods and the way data is analysed. In this study, I increase reliability by being 
explicit about the reasons for choices made in the course of both the data collection 
and during the analysis. 
Internal validity concerns the establishment of a causal relationship whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions. This implies exploring the 
possibility that a proposed causal relationship might be caused by a third variable, a 
so-called spurious effect (Yin, 2003:34). I enhance internal validity by explicitly 
operationalizing the variables and addressing rival explanations. The process-tracing 
technique contributes to increase internal validity, by focusing on documenting causal 
relationships at the micro level. 
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3.2.1 Process-tracing and data triangulation 
By combining process-tracing and data-triangulation, the reliability of the findings 
are enhanced. The aim of process-tracing is to illuminate a causal relationship 
between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable. 
[p]rocess tracing forces the investigator to take equifinality into account, that is, to 
consider the alternative paths through which the outcome could have occurred (…) 
it offers the possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal paths that are 
consistent with the outcome and the process-tracing evidence in a single case 
(George and Bennett, 2005:206-07). 
The application of process-tracing usually implies that one ought to carefully map the 
process and explore the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived 
expectations about the workings of the mechanism (Checkel, 2005:6). Thus, the 
technique of process-tracing is useful when connecting international institutions with 
socializing outcomes through the four causal mechanisms presented in the previous 
chapter. 
The data for process-tracing is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature, and includes 
historical memoirs, interviews, press accounts and documents (Checkel, 2005:6). 
This fits well with the method of data triangulation, where data reliability is 
strengthened when different modes of data collection lead to the same result. The 
intention is that by using preferably three, or more, modes of data collection, at least 
two will produce similar answers.  If the data collection produces three different 
answers, the questions need to be reframed, the method reconsidered, or both (Mabry, 
2008:221). In this study, I triangulate data from multiple sources including: 
qualitative interviews with scholars and officials in Botswana‘s and South Africa‘s 
foreign affairs departments; written primary sources such as treaties, protocols, 
communiqués and government documents; and secondary literature including 
newspaper articles and scholarly analyses.  
3.2.2 Interview design and selection of the informants 
Gaining access to government officials and politicians in developing countries can be 
demanding. The challenges include identifying the relevant, knowledgeable people, 
getting their attention and scheduling an interview. In both South Africa and 
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Botswana preliminary talks with Norwegian and foreign scholars working in the 
field, proved helpful in this process.
24
 The staffs at the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Pretoria, as well as the University of Botswana, were 
welcoming and helpful in advising me about potential informants both within the 
departments of foreign affairs as well as within the academic sphere.  
In both countries I focused on reaching informants that worked within the ambit of 
regional foreign policy formulation, either as government officials, other practitioners 
or scholars. In total, 9 respondents participated in semi-structured interviews, 4 within 
Botswana and 5 in South Africa. For an overview of the informants, see appendix 1. 
Additionally, I had informal conversations with 8 other relevant people. This group 
constituted scholars from South Africa, Botswana and Norway, in addition to a long-
time consultant to the Botswana government with experience and knowledge of the 
workings of the Botswana society. These interviews proved crucial in getting 
background information and access to relevant sources. As such, they contributed to 
increase the quality of the semi-structured interviews.  
The interviews were conducted in Gaborone and Pretoria in the period February 3–21 
2009. They were semi-structured, meaning that they were performed on the basis of 
an interview guide consisting of approximately 20 questions. All the questions were 
spelled out and formulated concretely in the interview guide. However, I asked 
additional questions and follow-ups depending on the informant‘s position and 
knowledge; and the general course of the conversation. The questions in the interview 
guide reflected five main topics: (1) what is the government‘s view on the Zimbabwe 
crisis? (2) How have domestic pressures affected the decision-making process? (3) 
How have regional and extra-regional pressures affected the decision-making 
process? (4) What does the informant characterize as the identity of the state? (5) 
How consistent is the government‘s foreign policy? 
Local scholars advised me that recording the interviews might inhibit the informants 
and create fears that the information gathered might be used for unintended purposes 
                                              
24 Jan Isaksen and Elling Tjønneland at Chr. Michelsen‘s Institute and Cedric de Coning at NUPI were particularly helpful 
in this regard.  
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at a later stage.
25
 This could have led the informants to withhold information or 
opinions that could have been important. I therefore chose to take notes during the 
interviews and transcribe them shortly after the session, while the interview was fresh 
in my mind. Generally, I noted keywords. However, when it was evident that the 
phrasing of an answer was particularly important, I took down exact quotes. In sum, 
this ensured a more confidential and trustful atmosphere during the interview, without 
diminishing the value of the information gathered to any relevant extent. 
There are primarily three limitations with my selection of respondents. First, the 
absence of politicians in my informant group can have impeded access to important 
insights. For obvious reasons, the task of reaching this segment of policymakers is 
extremely difficult and not one I engaged in. However, while I haven‘t interviewed 
this group personally, I have found ways to reduce the effects of this shortcoming. By 
referring to official speeches and monographs, biographies and transcripts of press 
interviews, I have gained access information thematically similar to the topics in my 
interview guide. A second limitation is the relatively small number of informants. 
However, this is countered by the use of data triangulation, preventing reliance on 
only one source of information. Additionally, the consistency of the informant‘s 
statements indicates that a saturation point was reached and that a higher number of 
respondents would not have significantly altered the overall findings (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995:73). A third limitation is the credibility of the informants. According to 
Rubin and Rubin (1995:224-25), interviews in which truth is most routinely 
problematic are evaluation interviews where the performance of the informant is 
questioned and valued. The informants interviewed for this study often receive 
funding from external donors. Additionally their performance is evaluated by their 
employers. Hence, they might be inclined to inflate their role in certain processes or 
paint a rosy picture of events to boost their own or their government‘s stature. To 
overcome this problem I made an effort to show understanding for the obstacles that 
policymakers meet, and tried to avoid making informants feel obliged to give 
formalistic statements on how things ―should have been done‖ (Rubin and Rubin, 
                                              
25 Conversation with Dr Yolanda Kemp Spies, Department of Political science, University of Pretoria 04.03.2009 
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1995:218-23). Data triangulation and comparing statements with those of other 
unrelated informants was crucial in weighing the evidence presented, and discounting 
for bias. 
3.3 Validity of variables 
I adopt Adcock and Colliers (2001) model for ensuring measurement validity
 26 
in 
both qualitative and quantitative research. Adcock and Collier describe the 
relationship between the initial concepts and actual observations. This is done by 
operationalizing concepts by creating indicators that are subsequently scored with 
reference to the empirical data. According to Adcock and Collier, measurement 
validity is achieved when the ―scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the 
corresponding concept‖ (2001:530). By sticking to Adcock and Collier‘s method of 
conceptualizing, operationalizing and creating indicators of key variables; and using 
case study and process-tracing to observe these variables, I improve validity. 
In this study, the independent variables are synonymous with the causal mechanisms 
described in the previous chapter: strategic calculation in the form of bargaining or 
social influence; role-playing; and normative suasion. The operationalization of these 
concepts and their subsequent indicators are based on Checkel‘s operationalizations. 
In the chapter presenting the theoretical framework, these operationalizations were 
fleshed out by developing indicators to achieve a higher degree of precision and 
quality of measurement (see p. 19).  
The dependent variable is the state‘s degree of compliance with the SADC peace and 
security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. However, as mentioned 
previously, the SADC treaty is ambiguous and can be seen to support both the norms 
of non-indifference as well as the norms of non-interference. I approach this in the 
following way: Depending on the degree of compliance with either set of norms, 
foreign policy outcomes will be distributed on a continuum where compliance with 
                                              
26 Measurement validity, also referred to as concept or construct validity, concerns establishing the correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied Yin, Robert K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage..  
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the norms of non-interference and the norms of non-indifference constitute the two 
extremes.  
Foreign policy outcomes in compliance with the norms of non-interference, will then 
include: states disregarding or minimizing the importance of human rights violations 
or unconstitutional changes of government within other states; outright support for 
the member state in question; and at the extreme end of the scale, threats or punitive 
measures directed at actors complying with the norms of non-indifference. Foreign 
policy outcomes with a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-indifference 
will include: vocal criticism of human rights violations within other member states, 
the call for initiating legal measures in accordance with international law, the issuing 
of sanctions or other punitive measures; and at the extreme end of the continuum, 
intervention with either civilian or military personnel.  
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4. South Africa  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to determine what causal mechanisms 
can explain South Africa‘s compliance with SADC‘s peace and security norms in its 
foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The core argument is that the mechanisms of 
primarily social influence and secondarily bargaining, contributed to socialize South 
Africa into a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-interference. 
Moreover, due to cognitive dissonance, a process where preferences are adjusted to 
actions, these norms were internalized.
27
  
Second, to identify the scope conditions which have enabled the main socializing 
mechanism to operate.  These include: (1) the group dynamics of SADC, (2) the prior 
beliefs of the ruling party, (3) that the socializing actor was an authoritative member 
of in-group to which the South Africa seeks to belong; (4) South Africa‘s identity as 
an ―Africa-oriented partner‖; (5) a novel and uncertain environment; and (6) the high 
degree of power centralization in the government.  
4.1 Foreign policy towards Zimbabwe 
Assessing the period up until 2004, Schoeman and Alden conclude that: 
South African foreign policy seems to oscillate between public support for the 
Mugabe regime, based on the conviction that the objective should be to contribute 
bilaterally and multilaterally to an internal solution to the crisis, and bouts of 
public, though guarded criticism based on frustration with the deteriorating 
situation and the impact on South Africa and the rest of the region (2004:2).  
This policy of constructive engagement with Mugabe is often dubbed ―quiet 
diplomacy‖.28 While South African leaders, at times, have been frank about the 
failures of this approach, they have been quick to point out that the alternative, open 
criticism, or what they call megaphone-diplomacy, is out of the question (Schoeman 
and Alden, 2004:4). In 2002 South Africa pushed for a harder line against Zimbabwe, 
                                              
27 The mechanism of cognitive dissonance will be further elaborated later in this chapter. See p. 56. 
28 For a broader discussion of the concept of quiet diplomacy, see Graham, Victoria. (2005) A Comparison of South 
Africa's Quiet Diplomacy Towards Nigeria and Zimbabwe., p. 200. Johannesburg: The University of Johannesburg. 
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agreeing to suspend the country from the Commonwealth. When the Commonwealth 
continued the suspension of Zimbabwe the following year, Nigeria and South Africa 
opposed the decision arguing that progress was being made in normalising the 
situation. When the Commonwealth still went forward with its decision, South Africa 
expressed its strong disagreement, stating that there had been no mandate laid down 
for Zimbabwe‘s continued suspension and referring to it as ―undemocratic and 
unhelpful‖ (Graham, 2005:141, Nathan, 2005).  
After a brutal crackdown against the opposition in March 2007, South Africa issued 
its strongest criticism of Zimbabwe to that date. Nevertheless, Tshwane claimed it 
would stick to its policy of quiet diplomacy because open criticism had yielded no 
results (The Guardian, 2007).
29
 Subsequently, a SADC summit in Tanzania called for 
a SADC sponsored inter-party dialogue that was to be facilitated by South Africa‘s 
president Thabo Mbeki. However, South Africa‘s so-called quiet diplomacy 
continued more or less unaltered. 
In 2008 Zimbabwe held presidential and parliamentary elections characterized by 
pre-election violence, persecutions and arrests of opposition politicians and human 
rights violations on behalf of the security forces. After the first round of elections, the 
South African government backed the SADC mission‘s statement that the elections 
had been a "peaceful and credible expression of the will of the people" (Thyne, 
2006). After the elections, however, South Africa worked towards reaching a 
consensus agreement within SADC on a common approach towards Zimbabwe. This 
was done simultaneously with President Mbeki‘s efforts as a mediator in the 
negotiations between ZANU-PF and MDC. While Mbeki resigned as president of 
South Africa in September 2008, these efforts finally led to the creation of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. 
Nevertheless, in general, South Africa‘s stance throughout the period from 2000 until 
the GNU was formed in February 2009 was to regard Zimbabwe‘s problems as 
primarily internal, and to be solved by its own leaders. 
                                              
29 Tshwane is South Africa‘s administrative capital also known as Pretoria. 
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Tshwane‘s foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe in this period involved 
disregard or minimization of the importance of human rights violations or 
unconstitutional changes of government in Zimbabwe; outright support for Mugabe; 
and criticism of other actors or states acting in according to the norms of non-
indifference. Thus, I conclude that it constitutes a foreign policy outcome with a high 
degree of compliance with the norms of non-interference. 
4.2 Historical and institutional context of South Africa 
The objective of this section is to set the stage for the analysis and determine the 
configuration of the scope conditions that are properties of the socializing actor, 
namely South Africa. To present the historical and institutional context in a 
systematic fashion, the discussion is structured around the following topics: prior 
beliefs; identity; identification; bureaucratic capacity; degree of power centralization; 
and the novelty of the environment. These topics relate to the SADC scope conditions 
presented in the previous chapter (see table 2, p. 33). 
4.2.1 Prior beliefs 
When the ANC came to power in 1994 the party had struggled for almost a century to 
introduce democracy, majority rule and human rights to South Africa. The Freedom 
Charter of 1955, containing the core principles of the ANC called for equal rights for 
all national groups and had an explicit focus on human rights in its approach to the 
struggle against apartheid.
30
 ANC‘s comprehensive foreign policy document (ANC, 
1994) indicates that the organization carries with it a strong dedication to human 
rights and democracy when it comes to foreign policy as well. Considering the 
importance of external assistance for the victory of the majority in South Africa, it 
has been important for South Africa not only to advocate these principles 
                                              
30 The Freedom Charter was the statement of core principles of the South African Congress Alliance, which consisted of the 
African National Congress and its allies the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and 
the Coloured People's Congress. The charter was adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on 26 June 1955. 
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domestically, but also translate them into ambitious and idealistic foreign policy 
goals. 
Simultaneously, the ANC, as a liberation movement with a Marxist-Leninist 
orientation, felt most at home in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was supportive of 
other liberation struggles and antagonistic towards Western powers that buttressed the 
apartheid regime (Nathan, 2008:2). This orientation is anti-imperialist in the sense 
that it rejects the interference of foreign – often Western – powers on the African 
continent. It is fundamentally sceptical of the intentions of these actors and sees their 
actions as attempts to exploit African states and their resources. This is combined 
with elements of Pan-Africanism, an ideology that calls for a politically united Africa 
and solidarity among African states.
31
 It rejects all shades of imperialism on the 
continent, and underscores the need for African solidarity. In its extreme form, this 
ideology rejects critique of African states or state elites as a betrayal of the Pan-
African cause. Mbeki and his supporters within the ANC have been sympathetic to 
these principles (see p.58) 
According to Checkel, normative suasion is more likely when the target of 
socialization has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing 
agency‘s message. The ANC carries with it two sets of ideologies that at times are in 
opposition to each other. While the legacy of human rights and democracy is 
somewhat inconsistent with the norms of non-interference, the principles of anti-
imperialism and Pan-Africanism are to some extent inconsistent with the norms of 
non-indifference. However, it is not possible to say that either of these two ideologies 
have enough foothold in the ANC to rule out compliance with either extreme of 
SADC‘s peace and security norms.  
                                              
31 This world-view is related to the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) that emerged in South Africa in the 60s, 
fronted by its leader, the late Steve Biko. From its onset, the BCM aggressively launched an attack on traditional White 
values, especially the ‗condescending‘ values of Whites of liberal opinion. The BCM spurred a greater cohesiveness and 
solidarity amongst black groups in general and the creation of a distinct Black identity in South Africa. 
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4.2.2 Identity  
One of the critical challenges that have confronted South Africa in its regional 
relations has been how to relate to its neighbours in a way that does not suggest 
insensitive hegemonism, but at the same time provides regional leadership (Matlosa, 
2007:104-06). South Africa holds a dominant position in Africa as a whole and in 
Southern Africa in particular. With a gross domestic product valued at US$ 453.3 
billion (2006),
32
 making up nearly a quarter of the continent‘s total, it is the economic 
powerhouse of Africa. In terms of military power, South Africa takes the lead.
33
 
Despite the fact that South Africa still is a developing country with a relatively weak 
state (Nathan, 2006), the country stands unchallenged in terms of material capacities 
in the sub-region.  
Since Apartheids demise, this has made South African foreign policy formation a 
balancing act. On the one hand, policymakers wanted to implement the ANC‘s 
ambitious foreign policy goals: the African Renaissance and its two main institutions 
the African Union and NEPAD.
34
 However, before even considering the feasibility of 
this project, South African leaders needed the goodwill of wary neighbour states. The 
uneasy balance between Tshwane‘s wish to portray itself as a partner, and the 
neighbouring states‘ perceptions of South Africa as a hegemon, created one of the 
major headaches for the country‘s foreign policy makers. This dynamic has been 
instrumental in determining the leeway of political leaders in the formation of South 
African foreign policy. In order to change the regional perception of South Africa, 
Tshwane has had to strengthen and mediate its role identity as an ―Africa-oriented 
partner‖ through both words and actions (Schoeman, 2007). The mantra among 
informants in the DFA: ―what is good for South Africa is good for the whole 
continent‖ illustrates this thinking. 
                                              
32 GDP (purchasing power parity), The CIA World Factbook 
33 At least if measured in terms of military spending. At its lowest, in 1999, South Africa‘s military expenditure was still 30 
percent of the Sub-Saharan total, and 20 percent of Africa‘s total. 
34 Mbeki‘s ―African Renaissance‖ or ―African agenda‖, refers to a wide range of measures to make democratic political 
systems, peace and security and accelerated economic growth the basis of development in Africa. This includes the African 
Union, the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) , the Peer-Review Mechanism (PRM). See Landsberg, 
Chris. (2007) South Africa and the Making of the African Union and Nepad: Mbeki's `Progressive African Agenda'. In 
South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era, edited by Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg. 
Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
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South Africa‘s type identity is Southern African and democratic, while its role 
identity leans towards ―Africa-oriented partner‖. Especially this latter role identity is 
likely to influence the socialization process, since it affects the way institutions relate 
to states, as well as how states relate to one another. This argument is also relevant 
for South Africa‘s relation to the in-group. 
4.2.3 Identification  
SADC is characterized by strong elements of group dynamics, where the former 
liberation states constitute the most cohesive faction, the in-group. The leaders of 
these states are determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity, and adhere 
strictly to the norms of non-interference. ―Forged in the heat of the struggles against 
colonialism and apartheid‖, this posture prohibits liberation movement states from 
publicly criticising each other (Nathan, 2006:611). Members of the out-group, like 
Botswana and Zambia, are viewed as second-class members because they have no 
history of liberation struggle (Orbon, 2009). 
South Africa, however, does not fit easily into either the in-group or the out-group. 
On the one hand, South Africa‘s road to majority rule is a result of both violent 
struggle and negotiations. On the other hand, the ANC is indebted, both ideologically 
and materially, to the liberation movements that supported them in crucial periods 
(Mills and Clapham, 1991:9, Schoeman and Alden, 2004:3). Now, leaders like Robert 
Mugabe, Namibia‘s Sam Nujoma and Angola‘s Eduardo dos Santos feel that they 
preceded the South African leadership in the liberation struggle and complain that the 
ANC government has not repaid the sacrifices their countries made for the liberation 
of South Africa (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003:186). While South Africa today is the 
most powerful in economic and military terms, Mugabe‘s legacy as a frontrunner in 
the liberation movement has enabled Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence in 
the region In this way the legacy of liberation politics is instrumental for the power 
dynamics in the region, creating a balance of power based more on history than on 
size and resources (Nathan, 2005:367).  
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A scope condition of both social influence and role-playing is when the target state 
identifies with the socializing group. South Africa‘s debt and affinity for the 
liberation movement states in the region, makes Tshwane identify with SADC‘s in-
group. This identification stems not only from historical ties, but also from strategic 
considerations, in terms of realizing the ―African Agenda‖. An additional scope 
condition that increases the likelihood of normative suasion is when the socializing 
agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or 
wants to belong. In SADC, Zimbabwe‘s strong position makes it the authoritative 
member of the in-group of former liberation states. This is something Tshwane‘s 
policymakers cannot ignore when trying to implement their African agenda and 
strengthen their identity as an ―Africa-oriented partner‖. 
4.2.4 Bureaucratic capacity 
During the Apartheid era, South African governments followed a traditional Western 
– industrial world – colonial policy approach, consisting of incremental policy 
changes controlled by white bureaucratic elites and aimed at preserving the status 
quo. From 1994 the policymaking processes changed with the emergence of a 
representative and legitimate government. The bureaucracy became a mix of new 
civil servants working next to Apartheid-era civil functionaries. While the former 
tended to emphasize internationalism and solidarity with the problems of the 
developing world, the latter embraced the logic of neo-realism, focusing on trade and 
the self-interest of the state (Nieuwkerk, 2006:91-92). Despite efforts to address these 
shortcomings, some of the ministerial departments were still transformed only on the 
senior management levels at the turn of the millennium (Booysen, 2001). This created 
problems in formulating and coordinating a coherent foreign policy. 
A scope condition that increases the likelihood of role-playing, is when the actor‘s 
bureaucratic capacity is low, impeding it from resorting to cost-benefit calculations 
typical of bargaining and social influence. This scope condition was present in South 
Africa. 
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4.2.5 Degree of power centralization  
Both Mandela and Mbeki‘s cabinets were characterized by a top-down approach to 
governing the state. This contributed to making foreign policy more susceptible to the 
vanities of the top leadership in general and the president in particular. Decisions 
were usually taken at the level of the presidency, if not by the president himself. The 
feature of non-transparency was to be strengthened under the presidency of Mbeki. 
His new system of integrated governance contributed to concentrate power in the 
hands of a small number of individuals occupying senior decision making positions in 
both the executive structures of government and of the ruling party (Nieuwkerk, 
2006:106-12). Under both presidents, societal interests, such as trade unions and 
other mass movements, had almost no impact on foreign policy. While they were 
allowed to voice their complaints, this did not alter the guidelines set out by the 
government.  
The degree of power centralization within the target state is a scope condition 
increasing the likelihood of socialization within SADC. South African foreign 
policymaking has been characterized by a high degree of power centralization in the 
government. This contributed to make South African leaders more open to influence 
from the international community, than from civil society or other domestic actors. 
4.2.6 Novelty of the environment 
When the government of national unity led by the ANC took office in 1994, South 
Africa‘s foreign policy had to be designed more or less from scratch. The ANC had 
only limited experience in foreign relations and certainly no experience with foreign 
policy-making through the state apparatus. Additionally, the rapidly changing 
international environment further complicated foreign policy formation for the new 
government. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union 
created an unstable and unpredictable international environment. Moreover, in the 
1990s Southern Africa‘s role in world politics diminished. The ―War on Terror‖ 
starting in 2001, did not change this situation. 
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A scope condition of normative suasion is when the agent is in a novel and uncertain 
environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information. This scope 
condition was existent in South Africa‘s case.  
This section has revealed the following scope conditions: The ruling party‘s prior 
beliefs were not inconsistent with the norms of non-interference. South Africa had a 
strong relation to SADC‘s in-group; a desire to strengthen its identity as an ―Africa-
oriented partner‖. Furthermore the government was in a novel environment; had a 
low bureaucratic capacity and a high degree of power centralization in the 
government. 
4.3 Analysing regional socialization 
The following analysis will show that social influence, in the form of concerted 
condemnation and criticism from the in-group of liberation movement states, 
contributed to cajole South Africa into following the norms of non-interference in its 
foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.  
4.3.1 Strategic calculation through social influence 
The first indicator of strategic calculation in South Africa‘s foreign policy towards 
Zimbabwe is the way foreign policy decisions are framed as calculations of costs and 
benefits. According to DFA official Ghulam H. Asmal (2009), South Africa‘s 
relatively successful mediation
35
 in Zimbabwe has ―enhanced South Africa‘s 
legitimacy as a broker and credible player in the region‖. However, Asmal claims that 
this is only an unintended consequence of Tshwane‘s approach, and that the process 
―has not been used to increase the stature of South Africa or to position [themselves] 
in the international community‖. There are reasons to be critical to this statement, not 
at least considering how highly the virtue of modesty is held within the ANC.
36
 South 
Africa does not necessarily have an interest in increasing its stature per se. However, 
                                              
35 South Africa‘s mediation effort can be deemed successful in reference to the creation of the Government of National 
Unity in February 2009. 
36 See Gumede, William Mervin. (2005) Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the Anc. Cape Town: Zebra Press. 
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it does have an interest in being accepted and trusted by the regional society of states 
and especially by the in-group. This became particularly acute as the implementation 
of the African Agenda became the overall objective of South African regional foreign 
policy towards the end of the 1990s. The result was an increased adherence to non-
interference and multilateralism, and an aversion to criticise or in any way go against 
the norms of the in-group. 
Rather than opt for unilateral action, South Africa has been highly pragmatic as to 
what policies on Zimbabwe it sees as feasible and constructive. This is reflected in 
the way South Africa has rejected SADC as an instrument to gather support for an 
interventionist approach towards Mugabe and ZANU-PF. According to DFA official, 
Makaya:  
The pressure from SADC has to be collective to be effective. It is impossible to get 
a consensus on such criticism. Mozambique, Namibia, Angola and South Africa, 
all have solidarity with Mugabe stemming from liberation politics (Makaya, 2009). 
This implies a pragmatic approach to the promotion of human rights. Implicitly, 
Makaya acknowledges the need for criticism, but as long as unison multilateral 
criticism is unachievable, silence, or quiet diplomacy, is preferable to unilateral 
action. The possibility of creating a second block of states within SADC that were 
critical of Zimbabwe was also out of the question. This would only serve to split 
SADC, and further undermine the resolve and efficiency of the organization. 
Moreover, it would sabotage South Africa‘s attempts at improving its role identity as 
a partner vis-à-vis the in-group of liberation movement states. After all, this group of 
states were the ones most likely to sabotage Mbeki‘s long-term objective of realizing 
the African agenda (Schoeman and Alden, 2004). 
The second indicator of strategic calculation is the way South Africa has manipulated 
norms strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. In its approach to 
Mugabe Tshwane has used, and interpreted, international norms to justify self-
interested claims and frame preferences and actions as norm consistent. South 
African officials and leaders openly endorse the norms of non-interference, stating 
that South Africa cannot criticize Zimbabwe. However, South Africa has not 
abandoned its interests in the promotion of human rights and democracy, something 
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clearly seen in its commitment to the International Criminal Court (this will be 
further discussed shortly) and the resources it spends to realize the African Agenda. 
However, the combination of adherence to the norm of non-interference, and at the 
same time a commitment to human rights and democracy makes foreign policy 
making a difficult task. When these two considerations come on collision course, 
however, it is the norms of non-interference that prevail (Nathan, 2008).  
Having found indicators of strategic calculation, it is necessary to determine whether 
social influence or bargaining has been most dominant. Social influence requires that 
the international institution constitutes a social environment that induces change in 
agent behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments. Through 
the 1990s, South Africa intervened in several internal conflicts in the region, to a 
large extent acting in compliance with the norms of non-indifference. These efforts 
included an extended diplomatic intervention after the coup in Nigeria in 1993 and a 
military intervention along with Botswana to mitigate political turmoil in Lesotho in 
1998. Moreover, South Africa opposed the in-group of liberation movement states‘ 
decision to intervene on the side of Congolese president Laurent Kabila in the civil 
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998. These efforts were 
sanctioned by the in-group, leading South Africa to back down and adopt policies 
more in compliance with the norms of non-interference. The following paragraphs 
will briefly sketch out the consequences of these events.
37
 
As a response to South Africa‘s diplomatic intervention in Nigeria, the in-group 
threatened neither military action nor sanctions, but rather regional isolation. They 
accused South Africa of ―expediency‖ and failing to consult them on African affairs 
(Nieuwkerk, 2006:143). Thabo Mbeki later concluded that the defeat in creating 
regional support for a tough stance on Nigeria ―highlighted the potential limits of 
                                              
37 Detailed descriptions of these events have not been omitted from this study, However, the analysis is based on the 
following scholarly texts: Nieuwkerk, Anthoni van. (2006) South Africa‘s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
on African Crises. In Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, p. 268. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 
Landsberg, Chris. (2000) Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine. Journal of Democracy 11, Landsberg, 
Christopher. (2004) The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition. p. 264 s. 
Johannesburg: Jacana Media., Southall, Roger. (1998) Democracy at Gunpoint? South Africa Intervenes. Southern Africa 
Report 14:12.  
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[South Africa‘s] influence as an individual country (...) and the need to act in concert 
with others and to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of foreign policy objectives‖ 
(Mbeki in Gumede, 2005:179, Sparks, 2003). For Mbeki and the South African 
government, in-group acceptance was seen as both a means to implement the African 
Agenda, as well as an end in itself, due to historical ties. Thus, regional isolation was 
just as severe as any material coercive action. 
The intervention in Lesotho restored order in the long run, but was a rather 
questionable success in the short term (Vleuten, 2008:206). In addition to dozens of 
civilian casualties, eight South African and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were 
killed. Anarchy and public demonstrations that had followed the invasion, led to 
looting of the capital and the destruction of two-thirds of commercial property in 
other major cities (Nathan, 2006:612). While the consequences of the intervention did 
not persuade South Africa to discard peacekeeping or peacemaking as foreign policy 
instrument, it certainly did make Tshwane wary of the potential consequences of an 
aggressive promotion of democracy in the region. For one, it exposed the limits of 
South African military capabilities and led to widespread domestic criticism of the 
government (Southall, 1998). More important in terms of regional socialization, 
South Africa‘s choice to intervene without the explicit consent of the SADC‘s in-
group increased tensions in regional politics. It fed into rival SADC member‘s 
(primarily Zimbabwe‘s) accusations that South Africa operated with double 
standards. South Africa had chosen to intervene militarily in Lesotho with a faulty 
SADC mandate while simultaneously objecting to the calls for a SADC intervention 
in the DRC (Landsberg, 2000:113, Mpanyane, 2009). This created problems in 
relation to South Africa‘s role identity vis-à-vis the in-group of liberations movement 
states. The most tangible result of these realizations was the formulation of the White 
paper on South African participation in international peace missions, approved in 
October 1998, immediately after the intervention. According to Santho (2000), the 
white paper was ―profoundly influenced by the disastrous intervention in Lesotho‖ 
and emphasized the need for a clear international mandate prior to the deployment of 
military contingents, as well as concern for South Africa‘s limited resources and 
capabilities (DFA, 1999). 
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In relation to the intervention in the DRC, it seems that Mandela and South Africa 
became somewhat more pragmatic in their approach towards the in-group. In contrast 
with the diplomatic intervention in Nigeria, the government now started taking the 
initiative, actively manipulating parties and seeking compromise to enhance their 
overall objectives of realizing the African Agenda and developing its role identity as 
an ―Africa-oriented‖ partner vis-à-vis the states in the region. (Berman and Sams, 
2000:179, Nathan, 2006:613-14, Southscan, 1998). This indicates that Tshwane 
adopted a more active approach, where bargaining played a larger role.  
When studying these three events, an emerging pattern is how the in-group of former 
liberation movement states constituted a social environment within the organization, 
distributing social rewards and punishments to force South Africa into compliance 
with its norms. In other words, I argue that, social influence was the mechanism 
leading South Africa to alter its foreign policies to comply with the norms of non-
interference. However, in the course of these events, South Africa‘s preferences 
changed to very little degree. Tshwane‘s commitment to human rights and 
accountability remained long-term objectives, as did the strengthening of South 
Africa‘s role identity as an ―Africa-oriented partner‖ vis-à-vis the regional states.   
Faced with the growing crisis in Zimbabwe at the turn of the millennium, these 
previous experiences made the mere possibility of social sanctions form a constraint 
on Tshwane‘s foreign policy formation. This informed South Africa‘s foreign policy 
on Zimbabwe. In the words of Edward Makaya, director for bilateral relations in the 
DFA: 
What would South Africa have achieved with a hard stance on Zimbabwe? Only 
African isolation. Then Mugabe‘s criticism [that South Africa is acting as a bully 
on the continent] would have been right. In this regard, the lessons learned in 
Nigeria and Lesotho were crucial in developing South Africa‘s foreign policy 
approach in the region (Makaya, 2009). 
According to Johnston, ―social influence rests on the `influenced´ actor having prior 
identification with a relevant reference group‖. The importance of this prior 
identification can be illustrated by South Africa‘s refusal to sign a non-surrender 
agreement with the US after the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in 2002. The creation of the ICC had created fears in Washington that the US 
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would lose jurisdiction over its own soldiers in foreign territory. Consequently, the 
American government passed an act restricting U.S. cooperation with the ICC, 
making U.S. support of peacekeeping missions and U.S. military aid conditional on 
the conclusion of bilateral non-surrender agreements (Kelley, 2007). When Tshwane 
refused to give in to American pressure to sign the non-surrender agreement, 
Washington cut off military aid to the country. While South Africa had bowed to the 
social sanctions from the SADC in-group, it was not willing to heed to Washington‘s 
pressures. The lack of both identification with, and need for acceptance from, the US, 
made South Africa prioritize normative ideals, in terms of adherence to human rights, 
over apparently materialist interests. To South Africa, neither the social nor the 
material components of Washington‘s rewards were considered important enough to 
sacrifice its commitment to the ICC.  
In relation to the crisis in Zimbabwe, this dynamic is reflected in the way the 
government has rejected Western criticism of their approach to Mugabe (The 
Guardian, 2008). At the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2008, SADC – and South 
Africa in particular – was given the task of finding a solution to the impasse. 
However, the US and the UK did not want to trust the AU with that task. Instead, 
they intended to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council imposing sanctions on 
Zimbabwe. South Africa responded by working actively to convince China and 
Russia that sanctions would be counterproductive to the AU‘s ability to engage 
successfully with Zimbabwe. In the end, the resolution was voted down (Makaya, 
2009). Paradoxically, the pressure from the extra-regional actors seems to have 
strengthened the resolve of the South African government to choose its own path: 
We value the EU, but I get frustrated when people judge or prejudge our effort (...) 
This is, after all, our region and we know how to act. In our opinion, the solution is 
there. It would therefore assist a great deal if the friends of the parties [referring to 
UK and US relationship to the MDC] would stick to our approach (Asmal, 2009). 
To sum up, the empirical data indicates that the mechanism of social influence, and to 
a certain extent bargaining, was crucial in socializing South Africa into compliance 
with the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy on Zimbabwe.  
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4.3.2 Internalization of the norms of non-interference 
The first indicator of norm internalization is when policymakers provide a full and 
thorough justification for their actions, arguing that it is the ―right thing to do‖. The 
empirical data suggests that Tshwane sees its foreign policy choices not only as 
strategically, but also morally correct. In 2001 a senior member of the ANC justified 
the ―quiet diplomacy‖ on Zimbabwe by arguing that South Africa would not repeat 
Mandela‘s ―terrible mistake‖ when he acted as a ―bully‖ against the Nigerian 
dictatorship and ―everyone stood aside and we were isolated‖ (Nathan, 2005:368). 
Not only does this statement show that the government has adapted its policies in the 
face of regional protest. By regarding the country‘s former behaviour as a ―terrible 
mistake‖ and South Africa as acting as a ―bully‖, it also shows an adoption of the 
language of the regional actors critical of South Africa‘s initial policy of human 
rights promotion. This indicates an internalization of the norm of non-interference 
beyond that of strategic calculation.  
This way of thinking was also common among the informants within South Africa‘s 
DFA. They emphasized that South Africa was neither morally nor politically 
authorised to impose a solution or intervene in the conflict between the parties in 
Zimbabwe (Asmal, 2009, Makaya, 2009, Reid, 2009, Vilakazi, 2009). The 
correctness of South Africa‘s approach was further elaborated with the view that ―a 
negotiated inclusive political process will lead to an inclusive long-lasting settlement. 
It had to be led by the parties themselves, and be driven from within‖ (Reid, 2009).  
On the question of avoiding a hegemon approach, Vilakazi says ―after all South 
Africa‘s approach has done so that Mbeki has the ears of all parties. The UK burnt 
their bridges as early as 1997‖ (Vilakazi, 2009). This contributes to show that 
policymakers provide thorough and well-founded justifications for their choices, 
indicating that the norms South Africa initially had complied with as a result of 
strategic calculation now are internalized. 
The second indicator of internalization of the norms of non-interference, is the fact 
that South African foreign policy is both coherent and consistent across contexts 
(Nathan, 2008, Nathan, 2005). In the UN Security Council, South African diplomats 
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have worked to vote down sanctions against Zimbabwe, upsetting both EU and US 
diplomats. More generally, they have promoted an anti-imperialist agenda seeking to 
keep matters of state‘s internal affairs out of the UNSC (Nathan, 2008:6). Instead, 
South African diplomats have forwarded matters, such as accusations of human rights 
abuses pointed at Burma and Sudan, to the UN Human Rights Committee. South 
Africa‘s adherence to the norm of non-interference is evident also in its relations to 
the regime in Sudan. As a member of the UN Security Council, South Africa has 
supported the Sudanese government in rejecting sanctions against combatants who 
attack civilians and obstruct peace efforts, and against parties to the conflict in Sudan 
that refuse to co-operate with UNAMID, the UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur 
(Nathan, 2008:1). On the issue of Zimbabwe, Mbeki has spoken with one voice to 
both the West and to the sub-region, emphasizing negotiations; that South Africa 
cannot impose its will on Zimbabwe; and that South Africa cannot openly criticize 
Mugabe. These findings not only indicate norm internalization, they also exclude the 
existence of role-playing. After all, role-playing would entail that agents were 
―unreflected as to their justification of their norm-compliant behaviour‖ and that 
compliance were consistent within contexts, but inconsistent across contexts.   
According to Checkel (2005), normative suasion is the only operating mechanism 
that leads directly to internalization of norms. However, neither the previous 
discussion nor the empirical data suggests that norm-conforming behaviour, in this 
case, is a result of interactions characterized as ―persuasion, normative suasion or 
learning‖.  Rather, social influence and bargaining hold ground as the dominant 
socializing mechanism.  
If normative suasion was not the operating mechanism, how can we explain that 
South Africa seems to have internalized the norms of non-interference? I propose one 
main cause, and two contributory causes. The main cause is the effect of cognitive 
dissonance. This is a condition that arises when an actor‘s behaviour is on a collision 
course with its preferences. For most actors, this discrepancy between conduct and 
preferences is not sustainable. According to Festinger (1957), ―actors who – for 
ulterior reasons – act in a certain manner and need to justify these activities to 
themselves and others begin to internalize the justification, even though they were 
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initially critical of it‖. Due to social influence and bargaining, Tshwane was forced to 
adopt policies that were on collision course with its stated preferences emphasizing 
the promotion of democracy and human rights. Cognitive dissonance led Tshwane to 
adapt its preferences to conform to its behaviour. This secondary mechanism of 
socialization was facilitated, first, by the Pan-Africanist and Anti-Imperialism 
sympathies inherent in the ANC leadership in general, and with Mbeki in particular. 
Second, it was strengthened by the external pressure from the West and the UK. 
According to Johnston (2001:500), the discomfort with being perceived as 
inconsistent or hypocritical in relation to past actions and commitments, and the 
positive moods with being viewed as consistent with one‘s self-professed identity, 
leads people whose consistency is challenged to respond by greater conformist 
behaviour. South Africa had for a long time sought to strengthen its role identity as an 
―Africa-oriented partner‖ in relation to the other states in the region. The more the 
criticism from the West increased, the more important it was for South Africa to 
show its commitment to the norms appropriate for its role identity. Identification with 
the in-group, as well as criticism from the authoritative member, Zimbabwe, 
strengthened this dynamic.  Tshwane could not retreat from its position on Zimbabwe 
without seeming to retreat from its dedication to Pan-Africanism in the face of 
―imperialist‖ pressures.  
4.3.3 Competing explanations 
In order to rule out other explanations for South Africa‘s compliance with the norms 
of non-interference in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, this section explores two 
competing, and one counterfactual, explanations. First, it discusses the impact of 
individuals, second, it investigates a strictly materialist rational approach, and third it 
examines why domestic pressures did not lead to a change in South Africa‘s foreign 
policy.  
Exploring the impact of individuals, it is evident that the crisis in Zimbabwe, and 
South Africa‘s foreign policy response, coincides more or less with the change of 
presidents in South Africa from Mandela to Mbeki. This could indicate that South 
Africa‘s compliance with the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy towards 
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Zimbabwe stems from the preferences of Mbeki, and not from any processes of 
regional socialization. Without doubt, there were important differences between 
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. According to researcher and former DFA 
employee, Tanana Mpanyane (2009), both leaders were dedicated personally to a 
human rights-based foreign policy, but Mbeki was ―more pragmatic and concerned 
with Pan-African solidarity with an African worldview‖. Mandela‘s worldview ―was 
that of an internationalist‖.  
However, despite the differences, in terms of foreign policy-making, it is more 
appropriate to regard the two presidencies as a continuous period. This is not to 
downplay the role of personal leadership in relation to state institutions, but rather to 
highlight Mbeki‘s formidable role in foreign policy formation during both periods. 
According to Mills (1997), Mandela‘s international prestige and stature, and his 
command of every major foreign policy decision and issue, was so complete as to 
almost overshadow the DFA, the cabinet and the parliament. However, Mbeki had an 
influential hand in fashioning and articulating foreign policy concerns. According to 
Director of bilateral affairs in the DFA, Edward Makaya (2009), Mbeki was ―crucial 
in terms of policy formation‖ right from the start. He likens the relationship between 
the two leaders as that of Mandela acting as a ―chairman of the board‖, while Mbeki 
held the role of ―chief executive‖.38  
Mbeki‘s adherence to Pan-Africanism did not prevent him from taking part in the 
interventions in Lesotho and Nigeria and in the conflict over the in-groups 
intervention in the DRC. The outcomes of these efforts, however, did not leave him 
unchanged: 
Mbeki was always sympathetic to Pan-African solidarity, but in his presidency 
these thoughts were refined and implemented. South Africa‘s foreign policy 
incursion in Nigeria, Lesotho and the DRC only helped convince Mbeki of the 
correctness of his foreign policy strategy. He became convinced that South Africa 
cannot become the regional hegemon, in the sense that there is no room for 
unilateralism. This realization also made it necessary to refrain from being seen to 
                                              
38 See also Nieuwkerk. South Africa‘s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Decision-Making on African Crises. p. 97, Gumede. 
Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the Anc. p. 62-63 and Mills, Greg. (1997) Leaning All over the Place? The Not-
So-New South Africa‘s Foreign 
Policy. In Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner: In Search of a South African Foreign Policy, edited by Hussein 
Solomon. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
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listen to Western powers (…) The intrinsic values behind Mbeki‘s policies have 
not necessarily changed, but the strategy on how to accomplish these goals has 
(Mpanyane, 2009). 
While Mbeki may not have experienced any all out change of values or perceptions, 
as Mpanyane points out, the events of the 1990s convinced him of the rightness of the 
Pan-African cause, emphasizing multilateralism and non-interference. Rather, South 
Africa‘s foreign policy on Zimbabwe was first and foremost influenced by external 
reactions to South Africa‘s initial attempts at unilaterally promoting democracy and 
human rights in the region in the 1990s. This strengthens my argument that regional 
socialization through social influence and bargaining is best suited to explain South 
Africa‘s foreign policy on Zimbabwe.  
A rational/materialist explanation could argue that Tshwane‘s foreign policy reflects 
an acknowledgement that South Africa does not have sufficient leverage over 
Zimbabwe to impose any policy changes. Thus, the rational solution for Tshwane was 
to maximize its gains within these given constraints. However, in terms of material 
interests South Africa has had much to gain from a more interventionist approach. 
First, South Africa has seen a large influx of refugees
39
 pressuring already weakened 
public service institutions (Makaya, 2009). These refugees have been accused of 
taking jobs and committing crime, spurring eruptions of xenophobic violence 
(Steinberg, 2008). Second, in terms of domestic politics, the media, NGOs and civil 
society have all been critical of the government‘s policy towards Zimbabwe. Finally, 
a continued economic meltdown has been, and will continue to be, detrimental to 
South Africa‘s own economy. These factors all speak in favour of following a more 
interventionist approach on Zimbabwe, such as closing borders, freezing trade, 
cutting power supplies. Arguably, these are all policies that would have had relatively 
little impact on South Africa, but a large impact on Zimbabwe. In strict material 
terms, they could therefore be deemed rational. Adding ideas and identity to the 
equation, however, it is clear that such policies would be detrimental to South 
Africa‘s role identity as an ―Africa-oriented partner‖ vis-à-vis the regional actors. 
                                              
39 No one knows the exact number, but there are probably at least 3 million Zimbabweans in South Africa today. 
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Finally, we turn to the impact of domestic pressures. While the trade union COSATU 
and the communist party SACP hold large constituencies and have historically been 
influential within the ANC, their protests against Tshwane‘s foreign policy on 
Zimbabwe have not been heard.
40
 According to Ghulam Asmal:  
We have discussed the issue [of Zimbabwe] with the critical parties of the civil 
society and engaged them in debate, but at the same time we must keep our eye on 
the ball. The criticism has not made us reconsider our approach. Criticism is part of 
the unenviable job of the negotiator. He must listen, but cannot defend himself 
(Asmal, 2009).  
Tshwane‘s foreign policy is more likely to be informed by events or interactions in 
the international environment than as a result of the impact of the opposition parties 
or public opinion. This indicates that the scope condition of transgovernmental 
reinforcement is not found in the case of South Africa, or at least that attempts at 
transgovernmental reinforcement did not have any measurable effects on foreign 
policy-making. Moreover, it confirms that the high degree of power centralization in 
the government has facilitated the socialization of the state into the norms of non-
interference. 
4.4 Findings  
This chapter has analyzed whether one, or more, of Checkel‘s causal mechanisms can 
explain South Africa‘s compliance with SADC‘s peace and security norms in its 
foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The analysis indicates that the mechanism that 
best explains South Africa‘s degree of compliance with SADC‘s peace and security 
norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe is, primarily, the mechanism of social 
influence and, secondarily, bargaining.  The analysis shows that the following scope 
conditions have enabled the effectiveness of the causal mechanism.  
 Group dynamics of the organization: Lack of common norms and values 
within SADC led to the creation of rivalling groups, impeding the organization 
from reaching agreements and implementing solutions on peace and security 
                                              
40 See for example: News24.com. 27.10, 2004 Deportation: Sacp ‗Outraged‘. 
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issues. In this environment, the in-group of former liberation movements was 
the most cohesive and had most political power relative to other actors. The 
in-group could therefore impose sanctions on what it considered to be deviant 
behaviour. 
 The socializing actor was an authoritative member of an in-group to 
which the target belongs or wants to belong: South Africa‘s ambition of 
implementing the African agenda, in combination with its historical ties with 
the former liberation movements, placed Zimbabwe as the authoritative 
member of the in-group to which South Africa wanted to belong. This made 
Tshwane vulnerable for social sanctions from Mugabe.  
 Prior beliefs: The beliefs of South Africa‘s leaders were not in conflict with 
the norms of non-interference. 
 The identity of the target state: South Africa has sought to rid itself of the 
hegemon label, while strengthening its identity as an ―Africa-oriented partner‖ 
vis-à-vis the other states in the region. This made it necessary to seek 
multilateral solutions to regional problems and accept the norms of the 
dominant group. 
 The target of the socialization attempt was in a novel and uncertain 
environment: This, first and foremost, made South Africa unprepared for the 
regional response spurred by Tshwane‘s initial progressive policies in Nigeria, 
Lesotho and the DRC.  
 High degree of power centralization in the target state government: This 
prevented civil society and opposition parties from influencing and changing 
South African foreign policy, leaving the socialization process to continue 
more or less undisturbed. 
This gives the following graphical illustration of the socialization process in South 
Africa (FIGURE 2.): 
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The analysis also shows that the norms of non-interference have been internalized 
and form part of South African policy formation. This has mainly been the result of 
the secondary mechanism of cognitive dissonance. However, while Tshwane has 
internalized the norms of non-interference, this has not made South Africa leave its 
adherence to the promotion of human rights and democracy. These values continue to 
form part of South Africa‘s identity and interests. However, the lessons learned in the 
1990s has convinced South Africa‘s foreign policy-makers that the only way to 
promote these norms are through multilateral efforts (Hamill, 2006). In order to 
promote human rights and democracy, Tshwane has had to follow policies that would 
be considered legitimate by all SADC members. Because of the lack of common 
norms within SADC, however, the respect for state sovereignty and adherence to the 
norms of non-interference tends to trump the norms of non-indifference (Nathan, 
2008). This has made the issue of dealing with human rights violations in other 
countries an extremely complicated endeavor for South Africa‘s policymakers. 
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5. Botswana 
As in the previous analysis, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to determine 
what causal mechanisms can explain Botswana‘s compliance with SADC‘s peace and 
security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The core argument is that 
Gaborone‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has mainly been the result of cost-
benefit calculations independent of any socialization attempts. However, normative 
suasion also played a role in facilitating the outcome. The SADC‘s legal templates, 
although not adhered to by all member states, provided a guideline for appropriate 
behaviour that was compatible with both the ―liberal democratic‖ as well as the 
―Southern African‖ aspects of Botswana‘s identity. 
Second, the analysis seeks to identify the scope conditions under which the 
socializing mechanism of normative suasion has been enabled. These include: (1) the 
group dynamics of SADC, (2) the existence of legal templates with explicit 
guidelines for appropriate conduct, (3) Botswana‘s liberal democratic identity, and 
(4) the prior beliefs of the ruling party and the government. 
5.1 Foreign policy towards Zimbabwe 
During the first years of the crisis in Zimbabwe, the government of Botswana 
vacillated in its dealings with Mugabe and Zanu-PF. More often than not, Botswana 
followed the SADC approach of quiet diplomacy. In the West, however, presidents 
Quett Masire and Festus Mogae started criticizing Zimbabwe more openly (Outlule, 
2009). President Mogae became known as the first leader in the region to explicitly 
link the deteriorating economic situation and the crisis in Zimbabwe to bad 
governance (ISS, 2009): 
The reality is that the region cannot afford to have its second-largest economy 
sinking because of this situation…while we support land reform in Zimbabwe 
completely, we feel the implementation of the strategy is incorrect. (Mogae quoted 
in The Guardian, 2001) 
However, criticism remained guarded and Botswana mainly stuck with SADC‘s 
approach, relying on South Africa‘s efforts to find a domestic solution to the crisis.  
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When Zimbabwe held parliamentary elections in 2005, a delegation from Botswana 
formed part of the SADC observer mission. However, while the opposition and 
Western countries argued that the elections had been flawed, Botswana‘s observers 
reported that they were free and fair (Mmegi, 2005). 
The major shift in Botswana‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe came after the 
elections in 2008. When the election results were held back and MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off elections, Botswana called for sanctions against 
Mugabe and the expulsion of Zimbabwe from regional organizations, namely SADC 
and the AU (Financial Times, 2009, Skelemani, 2009). This time the criticism was 
not only directed to the Western world, but was advanced both at the AU summit in 
Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2008 and at SADC‘s summits. President Khama and Foreign 
Minister Phandu Skelemani repeatedly stated that they did not recognize the 
legitimacy of President Mugabe and Zanu-PF, and demanded a re-run of the flawed 
elections. 
In the last years, and especially after the 2008 elections, Botswana‘s foreign policy 
towards Zimbabwe has involved vocal criticism of human rights violations; calls for 
initiating measures against Zimbabwe and Mugabe through various forms of 
sanctions. I therefore conclude that it constitutes a foreign policy outcome with a high 
degree of compliance with the norms of non-indifference. 
5.2 Historical and institutional context of Botswana 
The objective of this section is to set the stage for the analysis and determine the 
configuration of the scope conditions constituting properties of the socializing actor, 
namely Botswana. As for the previous case, this section is structured around the 
topics related to the SADC scope conditions: prior beliefs; identity; identification; 
bureaucratic capacity; degree of power centralization; and the novelty of the 
environment (see table 2, p. 33). 
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5.2.1 Prior beliefs  
In contrast to many former colonies in the region, Botswana gained its independence 
mainly through cooperation and negotiation.
41
 In 1966, Britain accepted proposals for 
democratic self-government which lead to the first general elections and 
independence. The good relations with Britain, and the absence of any armed 
liberation movements, were conducive to a stable political and societal environment 
for the new leaders of Botswana. 
Furthermore, the capitalist pragmatism of Botswana‘s first leader, President Seretse 
Khama, contributed to detach the country from the so-called liberation politics and 
Pan-Africanist ideology. While Botswana‘s first mass party, the Bechuenaland 
Peoples Party (BPP) adopted a radical anti-colonial stance, Seretse Khama‘s 
Bechuenaland Democratic Party (BDP)
42
, integrated not only the emerging educated 
elite of teachers and civil servants, but also the traditional chiefs. The BDP, with its 
emphasis on a multiracial democratic society, emerged victorious from the first 
elections in 1965 and has held the reins of power ever since (Acemoglu et al., 
2001:15).  
In terms of ―ingrained, prior belief‖, Botswana‘s ruling party, the BDP, has 
emphasized democracy and economic prudence, while rejecting the Pan-Africanist 
solidarity of the former liberation movements. Thus, while the inherent beliefs of 
Botswana‘s ruling party were not in conflict with either extreme of SADC‘s peace 
and security norms, they were biased towards support for the norms of non-
difference.  
5.2.2 Identity 
Botswana‘s small size, and its position between the powerful states of South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, has concerned Botswana‘s leaders since independence (Dale, 1995). 
                                              
41 As early as 1895, three Tswana chiefs, Khama III, Batheon and Sebele, went to Britain to ask Queen Victoria for Britain, 
and not Cecil Rhodes to control the protectorate. The three chiefs succeeded in their endeavor to convince the colonial 
powers. See (Parsons, 1998) 
42 Later to become the Botswana Democratic Party 
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This has led Gaborone to seek to reduce the country‘s economic dependency on 
South Africa, while increasing cooperation with other states and a host of public and 
private aid donors – particularly in the West. In many ways the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa increased Botswana‘s international appeal. While South Africa was 
isolated regionally, and increasingly also globally during the 1980s, Botswana, with 
its democratic political system; economic growth and prudence; and tolerant racial 
climate, became a tempting substitute (Dale, 1995:151). Gaborone especially sought 
the assistance of the US, encouraging Washington to take over the leading role of 
economic benefactor and diplomatic shield. Political and military aid was a symbol of 
US commitment and ensured Washington access to key leaders (Zaffiro, 1992:98). 
Historically, Botswana‘s geopolitical position has made it vulnerable. More recently, 
however, these geopolitical features have also provided opportunities. Osei-Hwedie 
(2009) argues that Botswana‘s limited capabilities have given Gaborone leeway to 
formulate foreign policy more freely, without being interpreted as a threat to regional 
power structures. However, at the same time, Botswana‘s relations with the West has 
contributed to somewhat isolate the country regionally (Maundeni, 2009).  
Botswana‘s need for extra-regional partners has made its leaders emphasize its 
democratic type identity and its role identity as a ―Western-oriented partner‖. 
However, as will be argued, Botswana‘s democracy is far from flawless. This makes 
it necessary for Botswana‘s policymakers to continuously and inter-subjectively seek 
to manage, mediate and strengthen these aspects of its identity to prove eligible for 
aid, trade, and investments.  
5.2.3 Identification 
Botswana identifies as much, or even more, with extra-regional states as with other 
SADC states. As mentioned, the absence of armed struggle in pursuit of 
independence kept Botswana out of the network of armed liberation movements and 
alienated it from SADC‘s in-group of states. Moreover, during Apartheid, Gaborone 
had a largely pragmatic approach to the regime in South Africa. The governing 
principle was to avoid any action that could legitimize white minority rule, while at 
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the same time steering clear of policies that could give South Africa the pretext to 
intervene, either militarily or politically. However, as more states became 
independent from colonial rulers, and diamond mining made Botswana more 
economically independent from the southern neighbour, Gaborone‘s foreign policy 
towards South Africa became more activist (Niemann, 1993). Nevertheless, 
Botswana‘s support to the liberation struggle did not prevent the government from 
arresting or deporting ANC officials (Dale, 1995, Niemann, 1993). In other words, 
Botswana‘s support for the ANC was not limitless, but rather weighed against 
pragmatist preferences, and attuned at securing the sovereignty, stability, and the 
economy of Botswana.
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A scope condition increasing the likelihood of normative suasion is when the 
socializing agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target state 
belongs or wants to belong. Botswana‘s leaders were not particularly committed to 
the solidarity and camaraderie that defined SADC‘s in-group of states. Rather they 
sought allies and partners outside the region, such as the US and UK. This made 
Botswana more susceptible to extra-regional socialization attempts that emphasized 
democracy, human rights and the norms of non-indifference, rather than socialization 
attempts emanating from the SADC in-group. 
5.2.4 Bureaucratic capacity  
Botswana‘s bureaucracy has faced serious shortages of trained personnel. Despite 
conscious efforts to increase the capacity of the civil service and replace expatriates 
with local officials, there was still a lack of highly trained and skilled public servants 
in the mid 1990s (Hope, 1995). However, this has not prevented Botswana‘s foreign 
policy bureaucracy from successfully utilizing international institutions and 
international law, as well as its negotiation skills, to ensure greater revenues and 
profitable trade agreements (Acemoglu, et al., 2001:18). Moreover, the civil service is 
                                              
43 In 1987 the Botswana government bought shares in the South African diamond mining company, De Beers, and created a 
large scale soda ash and salt mining operation, the exports of which were destined for South Africa and the region. This 
happened at a time when the world was pressed to isolate the apartheid regime. See: Niemann, Michael. (1993) Diamonds 
Are a State's Best Friend: Botswana's Foreign Policy in Southern Africa. . Africa Today 40:21.  
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relatively well paid by international and private sector standards, contributing to a 
relatively low prevalence of corruption (Olowu, 1999).
44
  
A scope condition of role-playing is when the bureaucratic capacity of the target of 
socialization is low, preventing it from calculating the costs and benefits of possible 
courses of action. The limited capacity of the Botswana bureaucracy increased the 
likelihood of the state resorting to role-playing. However, judging by previous 
foreign policy successes, this feature should not be exaggerated.  
5.2.5 Degree of power centralization in the government 
Although Botswana has been hailed as Africa‘s oldest and most stable democracy 
(Acemoglu, et al., 2001), its political system has several flaws. Regular free elections 
are held, but there has never been a change of ruling party. While the sitting president 
has resigned several times, it has so far never happened during an election. Instead, 
the head of state has usually been superseded by his vice president in the middle of a 
presidential term (Good, 2002:15). This has enabled the new president to consolidate 
his power, and, in the face of an almost non-existent opposition, secure a victory in 
the ensuing elections. In terms of foreign policy formation, decisions are made by a 
small elite, where the president has the last word (Sharp, 2009). 
Botswana‘s indigenous political institutions, kgotlas, are often credited for the 
success of Botswana democratic culture (Acemoglu, et al., 2001).
45
 These forums 
enable public participation in the political process, and place restrictions on the 
political power of elites. However, several scholars (Binsbergen, 1995, Holm and 
Molutsi, 1992, Hope and Somolekae, 1998) argue that the kgotlas mostly constitute a 
rubber stamp on elite policies: 
Emphatic public reference to, and artificial emulation of, the kgotla model can 
produce, in the mind of common Batswana, a sense of historic continuity and 
                                              
44 According to Transparency International‘s index of perception of corruption Botswana scored 5.8 (10 being least 
corrupt), better than any other African country. 
45 In kgotlas, an assembly of adult males in which issues of the public were discussed, commoners were allowed to make 
suggestions and criticize chiefs Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. (2001) An African Success 
Story: Botswana. CEPR Discussion Papers.. 
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legitimation where in fact there is discontinuity, transformation and unchecked 
elite appropriation of societal power (Binsbergen, 1995). 
In order to bolster the party‘s popularity, Botswana‘s leaders still use the dynamics of 
the kgotla to adopt policies that resonate with the public. After Vice President Masire 
lost his place in the National Assembly in 1969,
46
 the government launched the 
Accelerated Rural Development Programme, involving extensive investment in 
infrastructure in rural areas. After losing ground in the 1994 elections, the BDP 
responded by introducing popular reforms such as reducing the voting age from 21 to 
18 and allowing Batswana outside the country to vote (Acemoglu, et al., 2001:15-16). 
Sitting President Ian Khama, uses such informal conversations with the public to ―get 
a sense of what people think [the government] should be doing‖ (FinancialTimes, 
2009).  
The degree of power centralization within the target state is a scope condition 
increasing the likelihood of socialization within SADC. The overall top-down feature 
of Botswana‘s democracy, combined with the country‘s dependence on foreign states 
and donors, contributes to make Botswana‘s leaders open to influence from the 
international community. At the same time, the government consults the public in 
order to adopt popular policies that can strengthen its hold on power. This decreases 
the relatively high degree of power centralization in the government somewhat. 
5.2.6 Novelty of the environment 
After the end of the Cold War and the demise of Apartheid, Botswana found itself at 
a foreign policy crossroads. Until then, foreign policy had largely been driven by 
Cold War and anti-Apartheid-inspired calculations of national interest and 
geopolitical constraints (Zaffiro, 1992). As states were democratizing in the region, 
and cold war allegiances were downplayed, Botswana needed to find a way to 
maintain its strategic appeal among its traditional partners and allies, first and 
foremost the UK and the US. Gaborone had fears that donors would abandon 
                                              
46 He was swiftly returned as one of the members nominated by President Khama 
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Botswana to engage the newly democratized South Africa. This meant that the 
country would have to find new ways to continue to be perceived as ―special‖ and 
attractive to the West (Dale, 1995:154). This development coincided with changes in 
the aid donor community‘s view on conditionality. In addition to the Washington 
consensus, social and political performance (multi-party democracy, human rights 
and good governance) now became the new mantra within the donor community 
(Singh, 2004:82). A scope condition of normative suasion is when the target of 
socialization is in a novel and uncertain environment. The aforementioned factors 
strengthened Gaborone‘s inclination to take cues from international institutions and 
other, more experienced actors, through the 1990s and well into the present decade. 
However, it is exaggerated to claim that the recent years, when the major shift in 
Botswana‘s policies has come, constituted a novel and uncertain environment for 
Botswana‘s policymakers. 
This section has revealed the following scope conditions: The ruling party‘s ingrained 
beliefs were not incompatible with any of the peace and security norms embedded in 
SADC. The government did not seek acceptance from SADC‘s in-group, but rather 
from Western states and donors. In terms of identity, Gaborone was concerned with 
strengthening its ―liberal democratic‖ type identity and its role identity as a ―Western-
oriented partner‖. Moreover, the government had a low bureaucratic capacity and a 
relatively high degree of power centralization. 
5.3 Analyzing regional socialization 
The following analysis will show that Botswana‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe 
was mainly the result of cost-benefit calculations in relation to the transnational 
consequences of the crisis in the neighbouring country. Moreover, it argues that 
socialization in the form of normative suasion did facilitate Botswana‘s choice of 
foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.  
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5.3.1 Strategic calculation  
A first indicator of strategic calculation is when foreign policy decisions are framed 
as a calculation of costs and benefits. While this indicator certainly is found in 
Botswana‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, there is little evidence that this 
outcome is due to socialization processes in regional institutions. The empirical 
evidence indicates that neither the SADC itself, nor other member states have been 
successful in cajoling Botswana into compliance with the norms of non-indifference. 
Rather, the relevant costs and benefits that have influenced Botswana‘s stand is 
linked to the domestic concerns of the public and the political elite, as well as indirect 
pressure from extra-regional actors such as the US and the EU. 
A second indicator of socialization through strategic calculation is when agents 
manipulate norms strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. In this 
case we should see Botswana‘s leaders trying to give the impression that they are 
critical of Mugabe, while simultaneously refusing to address the issue in any 
substantial and binding way. This was more or less Gaborone‘s approach up until the 
elections in 2008. An analysis of more recent events, however, shows the complete 
opposite strategy. Botswana‘s policymakers now manipulate the norms of non-
indifference to mitigate possible negative regional reactions. Foreign Minister, 
Phandu Skelemani holds that: 
Botswana has no choice but to openly express her concern about the deteriorating 
political situation, and make calls for authorities in that country to take necessary 
steps to end the unnecessary suffering of the people of Zimbabwe (…) We do not 
accept that, by doing so, we are interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe because the situation in that country adversely affects us 
(SundayStandard, 2008, emphasis added). 
Botswana‘s justifications invoke the norm of state sovereignty:  
While the SADC has resorted to quiet diplomacy this does not exclude [us from] 
voicing our concerns. In articulating government views you are enacting your own 
sovereignty. We have to be consistent and principled (Ntakhwana, 2009). 
In other words, the data indicates that Botswana‘s foreign policy on Zimbabwe is 
influenced by cost-benefit calculations based on mainly domestic concerns. This 
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explanation is not compatible with regional socialization and will therefore be 
addressed more thoroughly in the section on competing explanations (see p. 82). 
5.3.2 Normative suasion through legal templates 
While Botswana‘s foreign policy on Zimbabwe seems to driven by a logic of 
consequences, the empirical data also reveals that it is informed by a logic of 
appropriateness. Director of the Africa and Asia Department, Zibane Ntakhwana 
(2009) states that Botswana took its position ―because of the principles. If required, 
we should have the moral courage to do so again‖. 
A first indicator of normative suasion is when empirical data show actors providing a 
full and thorough justification for their actions, arguing that compliance is ―the right 
thing to do‖. While this is no direct indicator of normative suasion, it does indicate 
internalization of norms. Botswana‘s policymakers perceive themselves as having the 
recipe for success in the region, a recipe that so far has brought them economic 
growth, stability and democracy. Moreover, they see it as a duty to spread this 
knowledge: 
When we joined [SADC] it was on the hope that its members will live by the 
standards they have set for themselves. We are disappointed. The President of this 
country has said it. But in all this we are happy because Botswana has a legitimate 
claim to moral ground (Phandu Skelemani quoted in Sunday Standard, 2008). 
This demonstrates Gaborone‘s dedication to democracy, as well as to the rules and 
treaties of SADC. When Mugabe‘s regime broke these rules in the 2008 elections, 
Gaborone saw it as their duty to criticize and sanction Zimbabwe:  
The government had to say something when the opposition decided to withdraw 
from the run-offs. We all ascribe to the principles of SADC on elections and 
democracy. We cannot accept the behaviour seen in Zimbabwe (Ntakhwana, 
2009). 
A mix of strategic calculation and a logic of appropriateness is evident in the 
government‘s justifications of their tougher stance on Zimbabwe. This is best 
summarized in the following statement by permanent secretary to the MFAIC, 
Samuel Outlule: 
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In an organization like SADC, one should expect that the same laws should apply 
in all countries. When we market ourselves as a region we must apply to the same 
rules. All these things [going on in Zimbabwe] were affecting the whole region 
(Outlule, 2009). 
On the one hand, Outlule refers to laws that should be ―expected‖ to be applied to in 
―all countries‖. On the other hand, this should be done because SADC ―markets‖ 
itself as a region and that the crisis is ―affecting‖ the whole region‖. No doubt, the 
crisis in Zimbabwe has affected the region, materially through refugee flows and 
other transnational consequences, and ideationally by questioning SADC‘s dedication 
to democracy. Botswana relies on its image as a liberal democratic state with a good 
record of governance and adherence to international law, in order to enhance trade, 
aid or investments. However, this image is not only a facade. Rather, it is a vital part 
of the country‘s identity and a product of how Botswana‘s leaders see themselves, 
how they wish to be seen, as well as how other states regard them. Thus, Botswana‘s 
decision to take a tougher stance on Zimbabwe reflects both self-interested cost-
benefit calculation, as well as a logic of appropriateness, where Botswana is acting in 
accordance with its liberal democratic identity.  
A second indicator of internalization of a norm is when agents are consistent across 
contexts. In the case of Botswana, this indicator can be somewhat evasive. 
Considering Botswana‘s modest size and relatively weak position in international 
politics, it is doubtful that the government has got the capabilities to be consistent 
across all contexts. Even so, the country shows a good track record, having 
contributed to UN operations in Somalia, the DRC and Darfur, as well as the 
intervention in Lesotho along with South Africa. Interviews also indicate a wider 
dedication to the norms of non-indifference.  
Perhaps in the future this process might set a precedent. We did not do it to please 
or amuse anyone. We took our position because of the principles. If required, we 
should have the moral courage to do so again. It must inform our positions in the 
future (Ntakhwana, 2009). 
In the domestic arena where one should expect the most consistency, on the other 
hand, Botswana has a mixed record. Several scholars are critical of the political 
system, questioning the checks and balances on government (Sebudubu and Osei-
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Hwedie, 2006) and the political elite‘s dedication to democracy (Good, 2002).47 GTZ 
coordinator and long-time Botswana resident, Helmut Orbon (2009), says ―the good 
governance and democratic credentials of Botswana are overrated internationally. It 
is not a lively participatory democracy that thrives on public, political discourse‖. 
Another domestic issue that contributes to question the governments‘ dedication to 
the norms of non-indifference has been the maltreatment of the indigenous San 
people. They have been evicted from their traditional homelands, allegedly to make 
way for diamond mining.
48
 In 2002, the UK-based NGO, Survival International (SI), 
rather successfully linked the conflict between the government and the San with the 
global campaign against ―Blood Diamonds‖.49  If Botswana‘s leaders were consistent 
in their adherence to the norms of non-indifference across contexts, it is likely that 
they would be more attentive to the critique forwarded against them. In the conflict 
with the San people and SI, however, state leaders rejected all accusations of human 
rights abuse. Their strategy was to clear Botswana‘s name abroad, rather than to 
address the accusations at home (Taylor and Mokhawa, 2003). 
This inconsistency in Gaborone‘s adherence to democracy and human rights could 
indicate that their dedication to democracy is a result of strategic calculation to gain 
rewards or that the government is role-playing democracy. However, this argument is 
weakened by two factors. First, if Gaborone‘s foreign policy was merely a result of 
cost-benefit considerations, they would presumably be content with a solution in 
Zimbabwe that contributed to stabilize the regional environment. However, it is clear 
that Botswana‘s policymakers, and Khama in particular, were not pleased with the 
                                              
47 Kenneth Good was professor at the University of Botswana for several years, but was deported from the country in 2005, 
allegedly because his of academic works, that were highly critical of Botswana‘s political elite and the treatment of the San 
people. See Taylor, Ian. (2006) The Limits of the African Miracle: Academic Freedom in Botswana and the Deportation of 
Kenneth Good. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:101 - 22. 
48 See Taylor, Ian, and Gladys Mokhawa. (2003) Not Forever: Botswana, Conflict Diamonds and the Bushmen. Afr Aff 
(Lond) 102:261-83. The United Nations Human Rights Council have criticized Botswana for their treatment of the San in 
both their 2006 and their 2008 reports. See also Ditshwanelo. (2006) Shadow Report to the United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Cerd), 68th Session, Geneva , 3 – 6 March 2006. Gaborone: Ditshwanelo. 
49 See also: Hirsch, John L. (2001) Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publ, Campbell, Greg. (2002) Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones. 
[Boulder, Colo.]: Westview Press. 
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power-sharing agreement that South Africa promoted in SADC. Khama feared that 
the Government of National Unity would set ―a bad precedent for the continent‖: 
We didn‘t agree to this sharing of power, just like we didn‘t agree to the Kenyan 
model either because we felt that what we need to do is to ensure, on the continent, 
that we have credible elections. And if a ruling party thinks it‘s likely to lose, and 
then uses its position as a ruling party to manipulate the outcome of the election so 
that they can extend their term in power, is not the way to go (quoted in Financial 
Times, 2009).
50
  
This quote demonstrates that Gaborone‘s interest in supporting democracy surpasses 
mere cost-benefit calculations. Second, while the domestic policies might question 
the ruling party‘s dedication to liberal democracy as understood in Europe, statements 
by informants do indicate that they adhere to a narrow form thereof. To them, the 
main hallmark of democracy is the holding of regular elections. In this view, it is 
unproblematic that civil society remains weak, public opinion has little impact 
besides elections, and the peaceful change of leaders – and not ruling parties – is 
seen as the litmus test of democratic consolidation (Good, 2002).
51
 Thus, I argue that 
Botswana‘s commitment to democracy – albeit a narrow form thereof – is 
internalized. Moreover, it seems that this dedication to democracy informs 
Botswana‘s foreign policy, at least when it is not overshadowed by more pragmatist 
concerns.
52
  
From where does this commitment to democracy, even in foreign politics, emanate? 
First, a probable source is Botswana‘s historic experience of peaceful liberation and 
its indigenous democratic institutions. Second, this inherent democratic culture has 
been nurtured and strengthened by Botswana‘s interaction with actors, both states and 
NGO‘s that have favoured the country for its democratic features and, after all, 
relatively good governance. However, this does not spring out of the regional 
                                              
50 Khama actually ended up backing the GNU after the MDC accepted it, but Khama still holds that a new run-off election 
would have been the best solution Financial Times. (2009) Transcription of Interview with Ian Khama.  
51 To paraphrase Samuel P. Huntington's "two-turnover test". See Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. p. 266-67 
52 Botswana‘s choice to sign the non-surrender agreement with the US over the ICC reflects the pragmatism of the BDP 
government in its international relations. Then Permanent Secretary to the MFAIC, Ernest Mpofu, ―admitted that the 
government had misgivings about the agreement‖ (Mukumbira, 2003). While the government‘s preferences remained in 
favor of the ICC, it could not afford losing the military aid relations with the US. 
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community. There is thus a possibility that Botswana has been socialized into the 
norms of non-indifference by extra-regional actors. However, a thorough 
investigation into this possibility is beyond the scope of this study. 
The empirical evidence does suggest, however, that Botswana‘s foreign policy is 
influenced by SADC‘s rules, principles and organizational objectives. While foreign 
policy-makers argue that Botswana follows universal principles of right conduct, and 
that their position would have been possible even without the SADC legal 
framework, a closer look at the empirical data suggests otherwise (Ntakhwana, 2009, 
Outlule, 2009). When justifying their foreign policy on Zimbabwe, the government 
uses the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (hereby 
referred to as the SADC elections principles) as their default reference for rightful 
conduct.
53
 This is a quote from the government‘s official justification for its 
condemnation of the Zimbabwe 2008 elections. 
It is abundantly clear (…) that the result of the June 27, 2008 run-off election 
cannot be accepted, as it violates the core principles of SADC, the African Union 
and the United Nations. As a country that practices democracy and the rule of law, 
Botswana does not, therefore, recognize the outcome of the Presidential run-off 
election, and would expect other SADC member states to do the same. It is against 
this background that Botswana urges SADC to assume its responsibilities by taking 
proactive steps that are consistent with its principles and objectives (Government 
of Botswana, 2008 emphasis added). 
The policymakers‘ desire to localize these principles within a Southern African 
context should not be underestimated. By doing this, they show that Botswana‘s 
foreign policy on Zimbabwe is not only compatible with the ―liberal democratic‖ 
aspects, but also with the ―Southern African‖ aspects of its identity. The following 
section will substantiate this argument.  
Because of the lack of common norms within the SADC community, there are no 
―teachers‖ accepted by all members on issues of peace and security (Nathan, 2006). 
                                              
53 Government of Botswana. (2008) Botswana's Position on Zimbabwe Presidential Run-Off Elections , Outlule, Samuel. 
(2009) Personal Interview February 17. Gaborone, Skelemani, Phandu. 2009 Transcript of a Sw Radio Africa Broadcast on 
January 23, 2009. Mmegi, Financial Times. Transcription of Interview with Ian Khama, Ntakhwana, Zibane J. (2009) 
Personal Interview February 20. Gaborone. 
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However, templates, in the form of protocols, treaties and principles, abound. While 
member states fail to agree on which norms to hold highest, SADC legal texts and 
protocols provide a wide range of templates for appropriate state behavior. Regarding 
technicalities, for instance trade standards, the ideational aspect is minimal. However, 
the SADC election principles, adopted by the SADC Summit in 2004, constituted a 
legal template rife with ideational aspect.
54
 The first section of the document, 
commits member states to the following principles in the conduct of democratic 
elections: 
Full participation of the citizens in 
the political process 
 Freedom of association 
 Political tolerance 
Regular intervals for elections as 
provided for by the respective 
National Constitutions 
Equal opportunity for all political 
parties to access the state media 
Equal opportunity to exercise the 
right to vote and be voted for 
Independence of the Judiciary and 
impartiality of the electoral 
institutions 
Voter education 
Acceptance and respect of the 
election results by political parties 
proclaimed to have been free and 
fair by the competent National 
Electoral Authorities in accordance 
with the law of the land 
Challenge of the election results as 
provided for in the law of the land 
The document also states that SADC can send electoral observation missions by 
invitation of the country holding the elections. These latter provisions make up the 
larger part of the document, making it stronger on election observation than on actual 
election management (Matlosa, 2005:6). Thus, the SADC election principles 
concerns issues directly related to the identity of states. To Botswana, with both an 
interest in being perceived as a liberal democracy in the region, both for strategic as 
well as ideational reasons, the SADC election principles were particularly salient. 
The adoption of templates regarding such issues will affect how a state is perceived 
by others, with the potential of affecting both preferences and identity. In short, these 
principles constituted a method for making judgements about the electoral processes 
                                              
54 The SADC Principles are related to existing principles crafted at level of the AU, as well as the existing SADC treaties 
and protocols, see Matlosa, Khabele. (2005) Democratisation at the Crossroads: Challenges for the Sadc Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. In ISS Paper 118. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
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within other member states that would be considered appropriate for, and compatible 
with, a Southern African state identity. 
Because the SADC election principles are subordinate to national laws, Tsunga  
(2005:4) argues that the principles are merely aspirational and ―do not create 
international obligations‖. In this regard, however, Botswana is a regional exception. 
First, Gaborone is dedicated to international treaties and agreements. Indeed, the 
government has been accused of having a poor record of ratifying international 
treaties and conventions (Ditshwanelo, 2006:25), but the empirical data indicates that 
once they have ratified international agreements, the government is dedicated to 
follow its obligations (Sharp, 2009).
55
 Foreign ministry official, Zibane Ntakhwana, 
explains the governments practice in this way: 
Before we sign agreements we have to look at how and if we are able to capacitate 
and implement them. On any given issue we do a thorough process of consulting to 
appreciate all dimensions. We will not rush to sign because it is considered the 
right thing to do. Rather, we seek to assure the implementation of all parts of the 
agreements. If we have reservations, we‘ll make them known and express them. If 
we cannot uphold the agreement, we do not sign (Ntakhwana, 2009). 
Botswana‘s explicit endorsement of the SADC election principles should therefore 
count as more than empty promises. Second, adherence to the election principles was 
not only compatible with Botswana‘s prior beliefs – it would also serve to strengthen 
Botswana‘s identity as liberal democratic state vis-à-vis extra-regional actors. Third, 
in contrast to, for example, human rights or other more universal guidelines, the 
limits of the election principles are clearly stated. They provide member states with a 
definition of democratic elections, and guidelines for how these events should be 
monitored and judged. Assuming that it is easier for states to make judgements about 
clearly defined events, rather than general issues, this would have contributed to 
make the SADC principles more applicable and easier to adhere to. 
These considerations, however, Botswana did not lead Botswana to invoke the SADC 
election principles to condemn Zimbabwe‘s flawed parliamentary elections in 2005. 
                                              
55 As an example, Botswana waited six years to sign the UN convention on the Rights of the Child, arguing that they would 
not be able to enforce it with regard to child labour, particularly in rural areas Sharp, Chris. (2009) Personal Interview 
February 18. Gaborone. UN. (2001) Convention on the Rights of the Child.. 
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Despite the fact, that the principles were adopted only months prior to the elections, 
and could have provided SADC with a powerful tool to hold Zimbabwe‘s leaders 
accountable. The emergence of the SADC principles had attracted considerable 
attention in both Europe and North America (Matlosa, 2005:13). However, despite 
this extra-regional pressure, Botswana went along with the rest of SADC to endorse 
the elections as free and fair (Osei-Hwedie, 2009).
56
  
Were the observers from Botswana ignorant of the situation in Zimbabwe, or were 
they just not dedicated enough to the SADC principles? The data from both 
informants and local media indicate that the government knew about the flaws of the 
2005 elections (Mmegi, 2005): 
Mugabe had created a situation where people in the cities [making up the bulk of 
MDC‘s followers] did not have time to vote because polls were closed too early. 
That benefited Zanu-PF (Outlule, 2009). 
Member of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature in South Africa, Dan Moabi,
57
 claimed 
that  Botswana‘s endorsement of the elections reflected a concern for the regional 
reaction if Gaborone were to give a frank assessment of the electoral process in 
Zimbabwe (Mohapi, 2005). This indicates that Botswana‘s choice to endorse the 
2005 elections, and not invoke the SADC election principles, was the result of social 
influence in an effort to reduce tensions and avoid regional criticism. 
Before the 2008 elections, however, the initial regional unity in support of Mugabe 
was starting to disintegrate. After a brutal crackdown against the MDC in March 
2007, the president of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, stated that quiet diplomacy had 
failed. He called on SADC to adopt measures to prevent Zimbabwe from falling 
further into economic and political turmoil (The Guardian, 2007). According to 
Landsberg, these events marked a: 
                                              
56 Osei-Hwedie adds two more reasons for the Botswana elections monitor‘s endorsement of the 2005 elections. First, the 
Botswana election observers based their assessment on the places/constituencies they visited for a limited time, which to 
them appeared free and fair. Second, Mugabe's government had not yet acquired the notoriety it has currently. Osei-
Hwedie, Bertha. (2009) Personal Communication May 5. 
57 ANC member and Gauteng Provincial Deputy Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
 81 
[f]undamental shift in South African policy and in African opinion towards 
Mugabe (…) African leaders want to see Zimbabwe become a stable democracy 
and prosperous again and Mugabe is not leading the country in that direction 
(Landsberg quoted in The Guardian, 2007). 
This demonstrated that it was possible for other SADC states to make judgements 
about the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. 
After the flawed elections in 2008, Botswana took a much tougher stand against the 
regime in Harare. President Khama called for sanctions and the expulsion of 
Zimbabwe from regional forums. Along with a shift in regional opinion that 
decreased the likelihood of social sanctions against Botswana, the election principles 
had contributed to broaden the scope of appropriate behaviour within SADC. 
Considering that the SADC election principles had been adopted by all member states 
(albeit not always with the best of intentions), these principles constituted a method 
for making judgements about the electoral processes within other member states that 
was considered appropriate, and compatible with, a Southern African state identity. 
Hence, for Botswana, the SADC principles provided a legal template that made it 
possible to accommodate both its ―Southern African‖, as well as its ―liberal 
democratic‖ identity.  
Johnston suggests that the application of legal templates for learning appropriate 
behavior only leads to mimicking or role-playing. However, in Botswana‘s case, 
these principles were already compatible with the prior beliefs of policymakers and 
the identity of the state. Accordingly, they were easily adopted and internalized, even 
though they were not accompanied by any explicit process of normative suasion. 
Prior to the adoption of the SADC election principles, it is doubtful that Botswana 
could have criticized Mugabe without receiving the scorn of other in-group members. 
This can explain why Botswana until recently criticized Zimbabwe more freely in 
Europe and the US, than within African contexts like SADC or the AU.
58
 However, I 
argue that the SADC election principles together with the shift in regional opinion 
                                              
58 There are of course other interpretations of this: a) Botswana has only been acting rhetorically when condemning Mugabe 
in front of Western leaders. b) it is much more difficult to condemn someone to their face than to travel 11 hours by plane 
and do the same thing. 
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mainly facilitated Botswana‘s position, and that it was not the main cause of 
Botswana‘s decision to follow the norms of non-indifference in its approach to the 
crisis in Zimbabwe. To present the main cause of this foreign policy shift, I now turn 
to explore alternative explanations.  
5.3.3 Competing explanations 
There are three explanations for why Botswana reacted more strongly to the 
fraudulent elections in 2008, than in 2005. The contributing causes were the effects of 
extra-regional influence and the change of leadership in Botswana, while the overall 
deterioration of the situation in Zimbabwe and the transnational consequences this 
had for Botswana, is considered the main cause of the foreign policy change.  
The effects of extra-regional influence on Botswana constitute one contributing 
cause. The conflict with the San and the subsequent  international shaming campaign 
by the British NGO Survival International contributed to taint Botswana‘s image as 
Southern Africa‘s beacon of democracy and good governance (Taylor and Mokhawa, 
2003). Although rich in natural resources, Botswana needs to increase the private 
sector to create jobs. Further improving its relations with the West to increase aid, 
trade and investments has been an important step towards accomplishing this task. In 
this regard, the crisis in Zimbabwe created an opportunity for Botswana to show its 
commitment to democratic ideals and the rule of law, strengthening its ―liberal 
democratic‖ and ―Western oriented‖ identity. Indeed, Botswana‘s tougher stance on 
Zimbabwe has resounded well within the US and the EU. Not surprisingly, however, 
Botswana‘s policymakers deny that their policy change is a result of strategic 
bargaining or social influence from the West: 
This is not a question for us to get a pat on the back (...) This is not a position of the 
West, although we found ourselves to share their concerns (...) It is difficult to 
measure by any terms, but the fact that we stayed the course has probably been 
beneficial. We followed our principles and I think we have got respect on a moral 
ground (Ntakhwana, 2009). 
While there is reason to be critical to this statement, it also holds some truth. After 
all, Botswana has just recently embraced the policies of the EU and the US, and not 
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after the crisis in Zimbabwe deteriorated to the extent that it could no longer be 
ignored.  
Another contributing cause was the impact of President Ian Khama. His background 
as army general and his loyalty to the US and the UK has contributed to influence the 
governments‘ preferences. The shift in foreign policy came only a few weeks after 
Khama had taken over the presidency from Festus Mogae. Khama has emphasized 
his commitment to democracy on several occasions.
59
 On the other hand, Khama has 
served as Vice President under Mogae from 1998 to 2008, and has had an influential 
role in Botswana‘s foreign policy during the entire crisis in Zimbabwe. Moreover, 
informants within the MFAIC, say they imagine that Mogae, faced with the same 
situation, ―would have done the same as Khama‖ (Ntakhwana, 2009). Thus, while 
Khama‘s style is certainly more confrontational than his predecessor, I argue that the 
change of leadership is not a sufficient explanation for Botswana‘s foreign policy 
change.  
The main cause of Gaborone‘s foreign policy shift, however, is the increasingly grave 
consequences that the crisis in Zimbabwe has had for Botswana on numerous arenas. 
The main costs are linked to provision of food, shelter and health facilities to the 
refugees; repatriation of illegal immigrants; increases in crime; economic loss as a 
result of declining trade with Zimbabwe; and outbreaks of foot and mouth disease 
and cholera outbreaks (Mmegi, 2006). Outlule argues that these adverse effects on the 
well being of Botswana and its citizens are the main reasons for the new foreign 
policy on Zimbabwe: 
The moment you adopt policies that impact on other countries, we can no longer 
talk of sovereignty. Then we must remind of the duties and responsibilities that we 
adhere to (Outlule, 2009). 
Moreover, the public in Botswana has long opposed SADC‘s quiet diplomacy, both 
for self-interested reasons, such as fear of crime, as well as altruistic reasons, 
                                              
59 He has also been criticized for ―authoritarianism‖ by the press and the opposition parties for the creation of an 
intelligence body with a secret budget, and a new media practitioners act Sebudubu, David. (2009) Personal Interview 
February 13. Gaborone. 
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protesting the suffering and human rights violations in the neighbouring country. The 
government shares this concern:  
It's a situation we'd rather not have, but what can we do? We can't chase away 
people who are running, who we know are running because there is great suffering 
in their own country (Skelemani, 2009). 
In February 2009 about 600 000 Zimbabweans were seeking refuge in Botswana, 
constituting approximately 1/3 of the total population. As a result, Botswana‘s ruling 
party, the BDP, has feared outbursts of xenophobic attacks equal to those seen in 
South Africa. Additionally, policymakers mention pressures from civil society, NGOs 
and grassroots that are supportive of political change in Zimbabwe. According to 
Ntakhwana (2009), ―civil society has contributed to raise public awareness and 
opinion and had a positive impact on government policies.‖ 
In this perspective, the more interventionist approach towards Zimbabwe has 
benefited the Botswana government in three ways. First, it contributed to boost the 
government‘s popularity in the public opinion. Although Botswana‘s civil society has 
been critical of the governments handling of refugees, they were very pleased with 
Khama‘s criticism of Zimbabwe (Osei-Hwedie, 2009).60 Second, it strengthened 
Botswana‘s relations with the West by reiterating Botswana‘s dedication to a 
democratic region, strengthening the country‘s ―liberal democratic‖ identity vis-à-vis 
the EU and the US. Third, if the policy succeeds in contributing to a solving crisis in 
Zimbabwe, the policy may mitigate the suffering of Zimbabweans, as well as the 
adverse consequences this has had for Botswana‘s citizens and society.  
5.4 Findings 
This chapter has analyzed whether one, or more, of Checkel‘s causal mechanisms can 
explain Botswana‘s compliance with SADC‘s peace and security norms in its foreign 
policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. The previous discussion indicates that the 
                                              
60 Human rights group Ditshwanelo, trade unions and opposition parties.  
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main cause for the foreign policy change was the transnational consequences of the 
crisis in Zimbabwe. This led to a high refugee influx; spread of livestock diseases; 
decreasing trade; and public concern for the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. 
Although Botswana has had a high degree of power centralization, its leaders were 
simultaneously responsive to public grievances that threatened their hold on power. 
This sensitivity to public criticism was awakened as the situation in the neighbouring 
country deteriorated and started to affect the lives of ordinary people in Botswana. 
Contributing to these factors was Gaborone‘s need to revitalize its identity as a liberal 
democracy and ―Western-oriented partner‖ after having been tainted by SIs ―Blood 
diamond‖ campaign. Moreover, Gaborone was worried that Zimbabwe and Mugabe 
would affect the whole region, questioning SADC‘s adherence to democracy and 
human rights and thus undermining Botswana‘s efforts to attract investments, trade 
and aid.  
However, the analysis also indicates that socialization in the form of normative 
suasion through legal templates did facilitate Botswana‘s choice of foreign policy 
towards Zimbabwe. The SADC election principles ―taught‖ Botswana how to act in 
accordance with the ―Southern African‖ aspects of its identity, while at the same time 
following conduct considered appropriate for the ―liberal democratic‖ aspects of its 
identity. The SADC election principles thus enlarged the scope of behaviour that 
would be considered appropriate by the regional community. This contributed to 
remove some of the ideational constrains from Botswana‘s calculations of the most 
beneficial policies towards Zimbabwe. Gaborone could now choose among foreign 
policy outcomes that had a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-
indifference, without fearing regional condemnation. The analysis shows that the 
following scope conditions enabled the effectiveness of the causal mechanism. 
(FIGURE 3.): 
 Group dynamics of the organization: Lack of common norms and values led 
to the creation of rivalling groups, impeding the organization from reaching 
agreements and implementing solutions on peace and security issues. 
Botswana, however, did not identify with, nor need the acceptance of, SADC‘s 
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in-group. Instead, it sought acceptance from extra-regional partners such as the 
EU and the US. As a small country with limited capabilities, combined with a 
lack of ties to the in-group of states, this gave Botswana more leeway to 
dictate its own policies in the region. 
 The existence of a legal template with explicit guidelines for appropriate 
conduct: The SADC election principles contributed to make condemnation of 
Zimbabwe‘s flawed elections compatible with both Botswana‘s ―Southern 
African‖ and as well as its ―liberal democratic‖ identity. 
 Prior beliefs: Botswana‘s ruling party, the BDP, has emphasized democracy 
and economic prudence, and rejected the pan-Africanist solidarity of the 
former liberation movements. The beliefs of Botswana‘s leaders were 
therefore not in conflict with the norms of non-difference. 
 Identity of the target state: Botswana‘s ―liberal democratic‖ type identity has 
been both an end in itself, as well as a means to gain aid, trade and investments 
and to maintain its good relations with the West. Another aspect of 
Botswana‘s type identity is ―Southern African‖. The SADC principles 
expanded the scope of appropriate conduct for this latter aspect of Botswana‘s 
identity, rendering it possible to criticize the internal affairs of Zimbabwe.   
 
Normative suasion 
(template) 
Scope conditions: 
Group dynamics of 
the organization  
The existence of 
legal templates with 
explicit guidelines 
for appropriate 
conduct 
Identity of target 
state 
Prior beliefs 
FIGURE 3. Norm socialization in the case of Botswana 
Norms of non-
indifference 
Norms of non-
interference 
Policy 
outcome 
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been twofold. First, to determine what mechanisms 
can explain South Africa‘s and Botswana‘s degree of compliance with SADC‘s peace 
and security norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, it 
has been to map out the scope conditions under which these socializing mechanisms 
are enabled. To this end, Checkel‘s theoretical framework of international 
socialization was applied to each of the two cases through the method of structured, 
focused comparison. Checkel‘s framework was originally developed to study 
socialization in Europe. Building upon scholarly works on African international 
institutions in general, and SADC in particular, the framework has been adapted to 
Southern Africa, identifying scope conditions specific for this region.  
By keeping the investigation process explicit and systematic, the validity and the 
reliability of the study has been strengthened. This contributes to lay the ground for 
fruitful critique, as well as for further theoretical developments. 
Although SADC members do have several identity traits in common, they cannot be 
said to have a shared, coherent identity. Moreover, the norms governing issues of 
peace and security are ambiguous. Johnston (2005:1020) argues that without a 
coherent identity with a clearly linked set of normative characteristics, ―the 
socialization effects of the institution will be diluted or indeed nonexistent‖. SADC 
can thus be considered a ―least likely‖ case of norm socialization. Indeed, it is highly 
unlikely to see any all-out preference or identity change a result of normative suasion 
in the SADC region. Nevertheless, the findings challenge Johnston‘s claim by 
showing that norm socialization can occur under such adverse conditions (see table 
4).  
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TABLE 3. The general framework 
Case Trigger  Mechanisms Effect  Scope conditions 
Generic International 
institutions 
Bargaining 
Social 
influence 
Role playing 
Normative 
suasion 
Socialization Institutional 
design/setting of the 
interaction 
Properties of the actor 
to be socialized 
Properties of the 
socializing actor 
TABLE 4. The cases as presented in this study 
South 
Africa 
In-group 
acceptance 
Bargaining 
Social 
influence 
Behavioural 
change in line 
with the 
requirements of 
the institution 
Internalization 
through 
secondary 
mechanism of 
cognitive 
dissonance 
Group dynamics  
Socializing actor is 
authoritative member of 
in-group 
Prior beliefs 
Identity of target state 
Novel and uncertain 
environment 
High degree of power 
centralization  
Botswana SADC legal 
framework 
(especially 
SADC 
election 
principles) 
Normative 
suasion 
 
Learning new 
appropriate 
behaviour 
compatible with a 
Southern African 
state identity 
Group dynamics  
The existence of legal 
templates with explicit 
guidelines for 
appropriate conduct 
Prior beliefs  
Identity of target state 
Starting with South Africa, the analysis shows that the mechanism of social influence 
not only led to norm compliant behaviour, but even the internalization of the norms 
of non-interference. However, the socializing actor was not SADC as an institution, 
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but, first and foremost, the in-group of liberation movement states. This was enabled 
by several scope conditions inherent both to the regional organization, SADC, and the 
target state, South Africa (see table 4). In terms of the former, SADC‘s group 
dynamics made the in-group of former liberation movements the possibility to 
impose social sanctions on what it considered to be deviant behaviour. Moreover, in 
this group, Zimbabwe was the authoritative member, further complicating South 
African criticism. In terms of the latter, the prior beliefs of the ANC, as well as the 
identity of South Africa facilitated the adoption of the norms of non-interference. 
Additionally, a novel and uncertain environment made South Africa unprepared for 
the regional response and more responsive to regional cues, while the high degree of 
power centralization made the government less responsive to domestic pressures. The 
analysis also shows that the norms of non-interference have been internalized and 
form part of South African policy formation, mainly through the secondary 
mechanism of cognitive dissonance. However, this has not made South Africa leave 
its adherence to the promotion of human rights and democracy. These values 
continue to form part of South Africa‘s identity and interests, making the issue of 
dealing with human rights violations in other countries an extremely complicated 
endeavor. 
In the case of Botswana, the analysis shows that compliance with the norms of non-
indifference in the country‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe was largely a result of 
cost-benefit calculations independent of any socialization attempts. In other words, 
norm socialization cannot by itself explain the outcome. However, normative suasion 
did influence Botswana‘s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The creation and 
adoption of the SADC treaty (and especially the SADC election principles) ―taught‖ 
Botswana how to act in accordance with its ―Southern African‖ identity, while at the 
same time following conduct appropriate for its ―liberal democratic‖ identity. This 
was enabled by several scope conditions inherent both to SADC and Botswana (see 
table 4). In terms of the former, the group dynamics of SADC gave Botswana, with 
its lack of ties to the powerful in-group, more leeway to dictate its own policies in the 
region. The existence of legal templates with explicit guidelines for appropriate 
conduct, in particular the SADC election guidelines, contributed to make 
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condemnation of Zimbabwe‘s flawed elections compatible with both Botswana‘s 
―Southern African‖ and ―liberal democratic‖ identity. In terms of the latter, the prior 
beliefs of the ruling party, as well as the identity of the state, contributed to facilitate 
the adoption of the SADC election principles. This was the result of both normative 
concerns, in the form of a dedication to democracy, as well as more strategic 
concerns, in Botswana‘s efforts to attract aid, trade and investments.  
In sum, SADC‘s feature of group dynamics made issues of identity and identification 
key to the outcome of socialization attempts. This will be further elaborated below. 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
This investigation has two sets of theoretical implications. First, it shows that the 
adaption of Checkel‘s theoretical framework proves fruitful for the study of norm 
socialization within a Southern African context. The findings show its utility both in 
identifying regional norm socialization (the case of South Africa), as well as in 
questioning the effects of the phenomenon (the case of Botswana). The strength of the 
framework is that it, on the one hand, provides rigour to the investigation by offering 
four clearly defined causal mechanisms leading to socialization (bargaining, social 
influence, role-playing and normative suasion). On the other hand, the focus on 
identifying or clarifying scope conditions makes the framework flexible and 
adaptable to new contexts.  
Second, it provides further indications of the utility of ―engaging questions that cut 
across the rationalist/constructivist boundary‖ (Wendt and Fearon, 2002:52). The 
analysis shows that strategic calculations to a large extent can explain the behaviour 
of the actors. This is mainly due to the ambiguity of the SADC peace and security 
norms and the lack of common values within the organization which make trust and 
cooperation difficult. Simultaneously, however, issues of identity and identification 
play a pivotal role in determining the preferences and interests upon which these 
strategic calculations are based.  These issues of identity and identification are 
continuously mediated, constructed, and reconstructed socially. These processes are 
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informed by a variety of factors including geopolitics, prior beliefs, historical 
affinities, and cost-benefit calculations. Thus, while a purely rationalist account 
would have overemphasized the ―rationality‖ of the actors, a ―post-positivist‖ 
approach would have left out important issues of material capabilities and strategy. 
This study seeks to work the middle ground by capturing a nuanced picture more in 
synch with actual events. This is done by grounding potentially fleeting concepts, like 
identity, norms, social influence, role-playing and learning, in concrete and 
identifiable features of SADC and the member states. The findings are therefore not 
to be interpreted as support for either of the two paradigms, constructivism and 
rationalism. Rather, the study builds on the view that the point of IR scholarship is 
not to not to validate methods, but rather ―to answer questions about international 
politics that are of great normative concern‖ (Wendt and Fearon, 2002:68). 
6.2 Policy implications 
For practitioners that see the adoption of the norms of non-indifference and a greater 
concern for human rights and democracy as a desirable outcome of regional 
cooperation within SADC, this study provides the following policy implications: 
There is little in the findings to indicate that the SADC member states are 
increasingly moving towards adopting norms that can be labelled democratic. As the 
case study of South Africa demonstrates, socialization might just as well lead to 
internalization of the norms of non-interference. The reason is that as long as there is 
no agreement on the interpretation of SADC‘s peace and security norms, influential 
groups of states are more likely to become socializing actors, rather than the 
organization itself. However, as the case of Botswana shows, states inclined to 
comply with the norms of non-indifference can find justification and legitimization of 
their stands in SADC‘s treaties. Particularly, if the legal texts contain explicit 
guidelines that are less open to individual interpretation. In this way, SADC rules and 
treaties can become effective at a later point, despite their initial hollowness. 
However, for this to happen, dedication to democracy has to be strengthened, not 
only at the institutional level, but also within key member states. However, SADC‘s 
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particularities have often prevented the adoption of treaties and protocols that are 
both explicit and binding. A fruitful strategy would therefore be to lower the level of 
ambition in the content of the treaties, while at the same time making them more 
concrete and explicit. For SADC states that are willing to take commitments 
seriously, legal texts would thus provide an important tool, not only to determine 
possible courses of action, but also to legitimize and justify progressive actions and 
make them acceptable to the regional community. This can set off a process where 
obligations and promises made within SADC are increasingly respected by the 
members (Lindberg, 1970). In this way, practitioners can actually make use of 
SADC‘s group dynamics to strengthen member states‘ respect for human rights and 
democracy incrementally. 
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Appendix 1: Informants 
Botswana 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation (MFAIC) 
Samuel Outlule  
Director: Africa & Asia Department, MFAIC Zibane J. Ntakhwana 
GTZ coordinator, SADC Peace & Security Programme Helmut Orbon 
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Administrative 
Studies, University of Botswana 
Bertha Osei-Hwedie 
South Africa 
Director: Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
Edward X. Makaya 
Director: SADC, Africa Multilateral Branch, DFA Ghulam H. Asmal 
Deputy Director: Zambia & Zimbabwe, DFA John Vilakazi 
Assistant Director, Zambia & Zimbabwe, DFA Eden Reid 
Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies; and 
former researcher at the DFA (94–06) 
Tanana Mpanyane 
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